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III. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION*
A. Introduction to Federal Question Jurisdiction
As explained in the introduction to this issue, controlling the
choice of forum can provide significant advantages for litigants. In
most lawsuits, for either procedural or substantive reasons, the
parties involved have some motivation to control whether the
litigation ends up in federal or state court. "More and more, people
and interest groups are becoming acutely aware of the practical
significance of federal jurisdiction," particularly of the way in which
technical jurisdictional issues influence and reflect substantive
interests.
One of the ways that litigants bring their cases in federal court is
under the federal question theory. While diversity jurisdiction
focuses on the people involved in bringing the claim, federal
question jurisdiction focuses on the subject matter of the suit.
Generally, federal question jurisdiction exists when either Congress
or the federal courts decide that there is some federal interest
implicated by a suit that is worthy of scarce federal judicial
resources. Understanding the rules surrounding federal question
jurisdiction is essential, given that a vast number of the cases heard
in federal court are heard either under statutes that expressly confer
federal question jurisdiction or under the general federal question
2jurisdiction statute. At the same time, the test for federal question
jurisdiction can be extremely malleable, permitting the parties to
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1. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Caseload Burdens and Jurisdictional
Limitations: Some Observations from the History of the Federal Courts, 46
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 7, 19, 25 (2002/2003).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
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characterize the issues in state or federal law terms as suits their
interests.
This Section discusses three categories of federal questions
which civil litigants can use to their advantage. Part B discusses
Congress's power to expressly confer federal question jurisdiction in
a statute. When Congress does so, a plaintiff suing under that statute
may bring the suit in federal court, or if the plaintiff does not, the
defendant may remove to federal court. This Section also explains
the rather loose constitutional limitations placed on Congress's
ability to pass such statutes and the effect of Congress's increasingly
frequent attempts to "federalize" areas of substantive law.
Part C discusses a second type of federal questions, those falling
under § 1331. Claims "arising under" federal law may be deemed
federal questions by the court even though Congress did not write
any explicit jurisdictional provision to that effect. This section
discusses the current "arising under" test and the way litigants have
used the test to their advantage by appealing to various federal or
state interests.
Finally, Part D discusses the third way a claim can be deemed a
federal question, that is, complete preemption. Federal law can so
completely displace state law that there is essentially no state law left
under which to plead. Any claim brought under that state law then
becomes a federal question. This is the most rapidly changing area
of federal question jurisdiction, as plaintiffs attempt to plead under
state laws to avoid the harsh pro-defendant effects of certain federal
laws.
There is no strict line between the three categories of federal
questions, and in fact, defendants often remove citing various bases
as grounds for removal.3 The theme running through all three is that
the plaintiff, as "master of the complaint," has the first chance to
frame the issues in terms favorable to the suit. The plaintiff must do
the initial calculus, looking at all the possible state and federal claims
and the advantages of being in state or federal court. The plaintiff
must then design a suit with the best possibility of remaining in the
chosen forum. The purpose of this Section is to inform that calculus.
3. See, e.g., Chille v. United Airlines, No. 00-CV-6571L, 03-CV-6177L,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1022, at *5-*6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2004).
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B. Statutes Expressly Conferring Federal Question Jurisdiction
The text of many federal statutes expressly confer federal
question jurisdiction on the federal courts. For example, the
Securities Litigation Unified Standards Act ("SLUSA") states that a
certain type of litigation related to securities may be brought in
federal court and is always removable to federal court.4 Any case
brought under the cause of action contained in such a statute is
removable as a federal question.
Congress might want cases to be heard in federal court for a
variety of reasons. For instance, Congress's nominal goal in passing
SLUSA was to protect national interests in finance and banking. But
it is well recognized that the primary goal was to cut off plaintiff
flight to state court in securities cases, caused by favorable state
laws.6 In other cases, the goal might be uniformity of outcome or
protection of federal policy.
7
Congress's power to confer federal question jurisdiction is
limited by the constitutional provision outlining the power of the
federal courts. Article III of the Constitution provides federal courts
with the power to hear "all Cases... arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties."8 Congress may not
confer jurisdiction where the court does not have the power to hear
the case.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2) (2000).
5. Id. § 78b (stating that the legislation written in SLUSA was necessary
because of the "national public interest" in regulating transactions that affect
interstate commerce, national credit, banking, and taxes).
6. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d
116, 123 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional
Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort
Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1559, 1606-07
(2000) (noting Congress's decision to use jurisdiction rather than to preempt
substantive law).
7. A good example of both of these purposes is the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000), which permits federal jurisdiction in
cases against a foreign state. The statute reflects a deliberate attempt to
channel cases towards federal court. See id; see also Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1665 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting on other
grounds). Justice Breyer, commenting on this choice, stated that federal
jurisdiction is appropriate, because uniformity is necessary when sensitive
foreign relations are involved. Id. at 1665-66.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the term
"arising under" very broadly. In Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,9 the Court considered an Ohio statute that levied a fee against
all banks operating contrary to state law. 10 This included, according
to the terms of the statute, the federal bank in Ohio." The bank
removed the case because the legislation incorporating the federal
bank authorized the bank to sue and be sued in federal courts. 12 The
preliminary question, then, was whether Congress had overstepped
constitutional boundaries by automatically creating federal
jurisdiction over all cases where the federal bank was a party. 13 The
Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, upheld the constitutionality of
the statute, saying that where there was a federal "ingredient" in a
cause of action, Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction
over that cause of action on federal courts.' 4 The Court made it clear
that the federal ingredient need not even be in contention in every
case that could be brought under the jurisdictional provision; the
mere potentiality of a federal ingredient is sufficient.'
5
The Court held that in every "well constructed government," the
powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are
"potentially co-extensive," that is, the Legislature can delegate
jurisdiction to the federal courts over any matter that it can
constitutionally legislate.' 6 The Court said that this was particularly
9. 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
10. Id. at 740.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 817.
13. Id. at 818.
14. Id. at 823; see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353
U.S. 448, 482 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the ingredient test
as permitting federal question jurisdiction "on the remote possibility of
presentation of a federal question").
15. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824.
16. Id. at 818. This formulation provides a basis for the academic theory of
protective jurisdiction. LINDA MULLENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL
COURTS AND JURISDICTION §4.02(5), at 162 (1998). Protective jurisdiction is
a theory that attempts to explain why Congress should have the power to
confer jurisdiction over any area of the law it can constitutionally regulate. Id.
There are two basic strands of the theory. Id. The first one, the "greater
includes the lesser" theory, says that where Congress has the power to legislate
a particular area, it also has the lesser power of conferring jurisdiction over that
area to the federal court. Id. This is true even if it decides not to substantively
regulate the question. Id. at 163. The second theory, the "partial occupation"
1446
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true in the bank case. 17 Because the bank was a creation of federal
law, and because it had no rights or responsibilities but for federal
law, any possible case against it would have to arise under the laws
of the United States.18 Therefore, because it was within the power of
the legislature to create such a bank, it was within the power of
Congress to confer jurisdiction over matters related to the bank to the
federal courts. 19
Congress has used this sweeping power to "federalize" state law
20claims where there is essentially no federal law being interpreted.
For example, shortly after September 11, 2001, Congress passed the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.2' The act
confers jurisdiction on the federal courts for tort claims arising out of
the September 11 attacks. Although it requires that the federal courts
apply the substantive law of the state where the attacks occurred,
Congress nonetheless deemed federal court jurisdiction necessary to
ensure uniformity of decision and fair compensation for all victims.
22
It is unlikely that any individual tort claim will require interpretation
of federal law, as torts are almost exclusively state law issues. The
theory, is that Congress has the power to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts when there is an "articulated and active federal policy regulating [the]
field." Id. at 164.
The Court has often indicated its discomfort with the label "protective
jurisdiction," even though it appears to support the general idea. See Mesa v.
California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) ("We have, in the past, not found the
need to adopt a theory of 'protective jurisdiction' ... and we do not see any
need for doing so here."); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,
491 n.17 (1983) ("[W]e need not consider petitioner's alternative argument
that the Act is constitutional as an aspect of so-called 'protective
jurisdiction."'); Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 474-75 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("'Protective jurisdiction' ... cannot be justified
under any view of the allowable scope to be given to Article III... [and]
cannot generate an independent source for adjudication outside of the Article
III sanctions and what Congress has defined."). The Court has not mentioned
the term "protective jurisdiction" in any decision since 1995.
17. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 823-25.
20. See generally Vairo, supra note 6, at 1561 (raising federalism concerns
inherent in Congress's decision to federalize the forum).
21. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat 230, 241 (2001).
22. See 147 CONG. REc. S9,595 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
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only federal int&rest then is the concern for seeing victims
compensated and protecting the airline industry from bankruptcy.23
The federal courts are generally deferential to such
congressional decisions, and no court has expressly dealt with the
constitutionality of the jurisdictional provision in the Air
Transportation Safety Act.24 However, the Second Circuit recently
heard a case in which the defendant asked the court to extend
jurisdiction to a breach of contract claim against retrocessionaires
(those who insure re-insurers) based on insurance claims arising out
of the September 11. attacks.25  The court declined to extend
jurisdiction, saying that statutes should be construed to avoid raising
constitutional problems, and that construing the Airline Safety Act so
broadly "raises such doubts."
26
The court did not make clear why this claim raised greater
constitutional problems any more than the claims arising directly out
of the attacks.27 The only facts distinguishing the two is that
Congress specifically provided for jurisdiction over claims made by
direct tort victims, but not over reinsurers, and that the victims in this
case were one step further removed from the tragedy. This is a good
example of the fact that the court, while giving deference to
Congress to define jurisdiction, will likely read such jurisdictional
provisions narrowly to avoid constitutional problems and to limit
their jurisdiction.
28
23. Can. Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung, 335 F.3d 52,
55 (2d Cir. 2003).
24. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(3).
25. Can. Life Assurance, 335 F.3d at 52-53.
26. Id. at 59.
27. See id. at 58-59.
28. For a deeper analysis of federalism concerns related to the Air
Transportation Safety Act, see Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of
Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1265, 1286-94 (2002). There are many other
examples where Congress has federalized state law claims. The Y2K Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (2000), confers federal question jurisdiction over any
class action in which the plaintiff's harm arose out of an "actual or potential
Y2K failure." Id. §§ 6602(1), 6614(c)(1). A district court in New York
exerted jurisdiction over one such case without questioning the
constitutionality of the act. See Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
239 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that Congress found"significant federal interests were vindicated by having Y2K class action[s]...
proceed in federal courts"); see also Vairo, supra note 6, at 1561, 1608 n.257.
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It is important to understand that the ingredient test limits
Congress's authority to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to
hear certain types of claims. 29 Because the test is so broad, and
because the courts have accepted virtually every federal ingredient
that has been presented to them, it appears that Congress has the
power to put a jurisdiction-conferring statute in virtually any
legislation that it can pass under its Article I powers.
30
Given the breadth with which Congress and the courts have read
the ingredient test (a test which was very broad to begin with), a
litigant has virtually no chance of successfully challenging federal
jurisdiction on the basis that it is unconstitutional. In order to
challenge Congress's decision to confer federal question jurisdiction
in a particular statute, the litigant would have to argue that cases
arising under the statute had absolutely no potential federal
ingredient. It is very difficult to imagine that Congress could
constitutionally pass a law within its Article I powers that has no
possible federal ingredient. As such, once Congress has provided
federal jurisdiction over the interpretation of certain statutes, it is
very difficult for the litigants to challenge that grant as
unconstitutional.3 1
For an argument that Congress should have the power to pass such
jurisdictional statutes merely to protect federal interests, see Eric J. Segall,
Article III as a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the
Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REv. 361, 365-66 (2002). In the article, Segall
argues that permitting Congress to confer jurisdiction in such cases actually
protects state interests as well as federal interests. See id. at 387-89. He
argues that this strategy is less disruptive of state law than preempting state law
or creating new federal causes of action. Id. By transferring interpretation of
the law to the federal courts, Congress can ensure that federal interests are
protected without usurping areas of state law. Id. at 387.
29. See Vairo, supra note 6, at 1617-18.
30. See MULLENIX ET AL., supra note 16, § 4.02(2) at 155 n.15; Segall,
supra note 28, at 369; John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 962, 1018 (2002). See generally Barry Friedman, A Different
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1990) (discussing the tension between Congress and the
Courts in delineating federal court jurisdiction).
31. There may be another practical reason why there is very little litigation
on the scope of the constitutionality of the "arising under" provision. Such
cases would only arise when Congress has transferred a certain issue into
federal court by creating a federal cause of action or explicitly conferred
jurisdiction over a certain statute. Defendants, who tend to "start" the
1449
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A plaintiff who has a claim under a federal statute that expressly
confers federal jurisdiction, but prefers a state court forum has
essentially two options. The first is to show that the claim does not
fit into a narrow reading of the jurisdictional provision, as in the Air
Safety Act case above. The second is to ignore the federal claim. A
plaintiff may refuse to plead an available federal cause of action and
plead only pure state claims in order to avoid federal court.
32
All courts permit this because the plaintiff is not being
deceptive-rather, the plaintiff has done the calculation and decided
that a state court forum will raise its chances of success more than
adding the federal claim would.33
For example, in Lippitt v. Raymond James Financial Services,
Inc., 34 the plaintiff chose to sue under the California Unfair
Competition Law rather than the federal Securities and Exchange
Act.35 Although the action he complained of may have constituted a
violation of the Securities and Exchange Act as well, this is a
perfectly permissible choice.36 The plaintiff most likely calculated
that he had a better chance of winning under the state law in state
court then under the federal law in federal court. The plaintiff, as
"master of the complaint," may decide which combination of claims
will lead to the best chance of success, even if this decision involves
weighing the likely effect of federal or state jurisdiction.37 Forum
selection in this sense is no more than good legal strategy.
jurisdictional battles by removing, normally prefer federal jurisdiction.
Therefore, they have no motivation to challenge the constitutionality of a
congressional grant of federal question jurisdiction, because the case is being
heard in federal court, as they prefer. While plaintiffs have a motivation to
challenge jurisdiction, they tend to have less resources to fight jurisdiction
questions and might be especially hesitant to expend resources on such an
uphill battle. This may be part of the reason that the Air Transportation Safety
Act and the Y2K Act have gone largely unchallenged.
32. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 390 (1987). This statement,
of course, leaves to the side pleading in an area of complete preemption. See
infra Part III.D.
33. Of course, not every omitted federal claim is the product of such a
calculus; sometimes plaintiffs have simply not discovered claims available to
them, or for other reasons have decided not to sue in federal court.
34. 340 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2003).
35. Id. at 1036.
36. Id. at 1043.
37. Id. at 1041-43.
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C Federal Questions Originating Under § 1331
Not every federal question has such an explicit congressional
sanction. There is a broader category of federal questions, derived
from the general federal question statute, the breadth of which is left
largely up to the discretion of courts as they attempt to divine the
intent of Congress.
1. Background on the federal question statute
For the first hundred years of this nation's existence, there was
little statutory "federal question jurisdiction" to debate.38 Cases
brought under federal statutes that contained a specific grant of
jurisdiction were federal questions, and only those statutes produced
federal questions, because the constitutional provision was not self-
executing. 39 As a result, a great deal of federal law interpretation
occurred in state court.40 Then, in 1875, Congress passed a general
federal question statute, § 1331, conferring jurisdiction to the federal
courts over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.
'A
It is important to understand the difference between the
constitutional provision and the statutory one. Article III is a limit
on Congress's power to pass legislation conferring federal
jurisdiction on the federal courts.42 Section 1331, on the other hand,
governs situations in which litigants can file in federal court or
remove to federal court in the absence of a separate statute that
explicitly confers federal jurisdiction.43 There is some evidence that
Congress expressed its intent to make the powers coextensive with
the Constitution by using the same phrasing for the statutory limits as
the constitutional provision." However, the courts have interpreted
38. William H. Rehnquist, Keynote Address at the Future of the Federal
Courts Symposium (Apr. 9, 1996), in 46 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 267 (1996).
39. See also id.; cf Smith v. Adsit, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 185, 188 (1872)
(stating that for a federal question to exist in a case, the plaintiff must claim
some right or privilege under an act of Congress).
40. Id.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); see Friedman, supra note 30, at 21.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
44. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
8 n.8 (1983); see also Friedman, supra note 30, at 21. There is little evidence
as to what Congress's intent was in passing § 1331. See id. However, the
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§ 1331 as a much narrower provision.45  Although the courts
sometimes confuse and cross-pollinate the tests,46 litigants must
understand the differences.
The scope of the statute has been a source of contention since it
was passed in 1875. The first significant portion of the test as it
exists today was laid down in American Well Works Co. v. Laynes &
Bowler CO.4 7 There the Supreme Court said that a "suit arises under
the law that creates the cause of action." 48 This created a useful
bright line rule whereby jurisdiction could be determined early in the
suit. The American Well Works test is also the purest reflection of
Congress's plenary power to define the scope of federal jurisdiction.
Under the test, federal question jurisdiction existed only when
Congress chose to create a cause of action.49
However, the courts soon came to regard the narrow test as, in
the words of Judge Friendly, "more useful for inclusion than for the
exclusion for which it was intended., 50 In Smith v. Kansas City Title
& Trust Co.,51 the Court recognized a much broader range of cases
that could be heard in federal courts as federal questions.52 The
plaintiff in this case challenged the constitutionality of a farm bond
evidence that exists points toward a broad reading of federal question
jurisdiction that is roughly coextensive with the constitutional provision. Id.
This has caused some scholars to question what "congressional intent" today's
courts should really be looking at-the intent to create a cause of action in a
particular statute (as was given precedence in Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986)), or the intent of§ 1331 to allow a broad
range of cases into federal court. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 22-23.
45. See, e.g., Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807.
46. See infra note 98 (discussing the use of the language from Osborn
constitutionality test to interpret the Smith substantiality test).
47. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
48. Id. at 260.
49. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 4. The premise of congressional
control over the jurisdiction of lower federal courts is based on the fact that the
Constitution vests Congress with the power to create lower courts in Article
III, section 1, and that the power to create lower courts brings with it the power
to control the jurisdiction of those courts--"greater includes the lesser." Id.
There is an argument that Congress's control over federal jurisdiction is not
and should not be as absolute as most assume. See id. at 5-6. This is based on
the mandatory language of Article III, section 1, stating that judicial power
"shall be vested" in the federal courts. See id. at 6 (emphasis added).
50. TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964).
51. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
52. See id. at 199-202.
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act. 53 Even though state law created the cause of action, the Court
said that jurisdiction was proper where "the right to relief depends
upon the construction or application" of federal law. 54 Because the
outcome of the case depended on the constitutionality of the federal
act, the Court found that the district court properly took jurisdiction
over the case.55 However, the case did not lay out clear guidelines
for the lower courts as to where this holding would be controlling.
Then, in 1986, the Supreme Court made an attempt to clarify its
decision in Smith. The defendants in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Thompson56 manufactured a drug called Bendectin that
allegedly caused the plaintiffs' children to be born with deformities.
The plaintiffs brought several state causes of action, including
negligence and breach of warranty, but they also claimed that the
drugs were "misbranded" in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").57 The defendant removed the case,
claiming that this last cause of action created federal question
jurisdiction because it required interpretation of a substantial federal
question.
58
The Court first found, and the parties conceded, that the FDCA
did not create a federal private cause of action. 59 This turned out to
be almost determinative to the Court, because if there was no federal
cause of action, it would "flout congressional intent" to find federal
jurisdiction.6 ° The Court held that the absence of such a cause of
action is "tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence
of a claimed violation.., is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer
federal-question jurisdiction" on the federal court.
6 1
This statement would appear to bring an end to the Smith rule,
and return federal question jurisdiction to the American Well-Works
test. However, the footnotes in Merrell Dow muddied the question.
In a footnote written for the majority,62 Justice Stevens tried to
53. Id. at 182.
54. Id. at 199.
55. Id. at 201-02.
56. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
57. Id. at 805-06.
58. Id. at 806.
59. Id. at 809.
60. Id. at 812.
61. Id. at 814.
62. Id. at 814 n.12.
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reconcile two prior cases that appeared to be in direct conflict, Smith
and Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. 6 3  Both cases
contained a federal question that appeared to be determinative in the
lawsuit, but the Court only found jurisdiction in Smith. The majority
said that the two could be reconciled by looking at the nature of the
interest involved.64 Smith was concerned with the constitutionality
of an "important" act of Congress, while Moore and Merrell Dow
both required the courts to interpret a federal statute as the standard
for negligence in a state tort claim.
65
The dissent in Merrell Dow wrote that Smith and Moore were
patently irreconcilable. 66 The test laid out by the majority, it argued,
would require a "case-by-case appraisal" balancing the importance of
the preeminence of the state law and the nature of the federal
interest.6 7 Brennan, who authored the dissent, called for Moore to be
overturned, stating that commentators and the lower courts preferred
the Smith rule that there is jurisdiction where the right to relief
depends on the interpretation of federal law.68
The dissent also questioned the majority's conclusion that it
would flout congressional intent to confer federal jurisdiction where
Congress created no right of action.69 The dissent argued that even
63. 291 U.S. 205 (1934). The Supreme Court in Moore essentially held
that a state's decision to incorporate a federal standard into a state cause of
action did not constitute a federal question. Id. at 214-15. The holding is
along the same lines as Merrell Dow, but instead of relying on the lack of a
cause of action, the Court relied on the fact that the suit was essentially state-
based in nature. Id.
64. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Id.(Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 831-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); MULLENIX ET AL., supra
note 16, § 4.03(2)(c), at 175 (stating that even if Congress does not provide a
private remedy, federal interest may still exist). See generally Note, Mr. Smith
Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims
Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2272, 2289-90 (2002) [hereinafter Mr.
Smith Goes to Federal Court] (asserting that the lack of a private cause of
action may reflect more on the existing state remedies rather than on the
importance of the federal issue). This goes back to the question mentioned
above, supra note 44, regarding what congressional intent the courts should
really be looking at. Although Merrell Dow restricts the question of
congressional intent to whether or not Congress created a private right of
action, the existing legislative history points to Congress's intent for broad
1454
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where Congress did not create a remedy in a particular statute, it may
still want federal courts to adjudicate the issue.70
Merrell Dow added one more important wrinkle by cutting off
the argument that Congress had implied a cause of action in certain
suits, thus conferring jurisdiction on the federal court. Finding
implied causes of action was once common fare of the federal
courts.7 1 However, in Merrell Dow, the Court stated that it violates
"congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the
violation of the federal statute., 72 Since that time, courts have more
or less uniformly rejected implied causes of action. For example, in
Alexander v. Sandoval,73 the Supreme Court held that it was the
judiciary's task only to enforce federal rights of action created by
Congress, saying that "courts may not create [a cause of action] no
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how
compatible with the statute."
74
2. Modem interpretation after Merrell Dow
The lower courts were justifiably confused after the Supreme
Court's attempts at clarification. All circuits agreed that the federal
courts would continue to have jurisdiction where federal law created
the plaintiffs cause of action.75 However, with regard to the Smith
category of federal question cases, courts have acted with little
consistency as to what may constitute a substantial federal question.
There were many possible positions that could be supported with
reading of federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. The Merrell Dow
holding would seem to go against the congressional intent of the federal
question statute.
70. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (laying out a test for when there is
an implied private cause of action, focusing on congressional intent).
72. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812.
73, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
74. Id. at 286-87. There may be cause to question this conclusion,
however, given that both implied private causes of action and substantial
federal questions rely on congressional intent to divine when Congress wanted
to entrust certain things deemed especially important to the federal courts. The
jurisdictional result is the same, although the nuances are not. Substantial
federal questions leave a lot more state law intact than an implied cause of
action.
75. Indeed, the majority of substantial federal questions continue to be
those where a federal statute creates the cause of action. See Christianson v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988).
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some amount of legitimacy by the contradictory language of the
Merrell Dow decision. One thing is strikingly clear about the federal
courts' treatment of substantial federal questions post-Merrell Dow.
Many decisions choose to cite the exact same language from the
Smith and Merrell Dow decisions, but they come to very different
conclusions.
a. reincarnation of American-Well Works
Some courts have said that while a Smith test exists in theory,
only Congress can decide when something is substantial enough to
confer jurisdiction. This approach derives directly from language in
Merrell Dow that Congress's decision not to expressly create a
federal cause of action is tantamount to Congress saying that the
federal interest involved is not substantial.76 While masking itself in
Smith-like substantiality language, this approach essentially erases
seventy years of federal question precedent and reinstates the
American Well Works test that a case arises under the law that creates
the cause of action.
77
The Eleventh Circuit took this approach in Jairath v. Dyer.
78
After a lengthy discourse about the availability of federal jurisdiction
for substantial federal questions, the court quoted large portions of
Merrell Dow for the proposition that without a federal cause of
action, there essentially was no federal question.79  Jairath is
especially interesting considering that the court was interpreting a
portion of the Americans with Disabilities Act that did in fact
76. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
77. Some courts have not tried to mask the fact that they read Merrell Dow
to eviscerate the Smith test. See, e.g., Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 223
n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating in dicta that § 1331 does not include jurisdiction
"where Congress has determined that there should be no private cause of
action for violation of the federal law"); PCS 2000 LP v. Romulus
Telecomms., Inc., 148 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that there must be a
federally cognizable cause of action because "'the presence of [a] federal issue
as an element of [a] state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which
jurisdiction would serve congressional purposes and the federal system"'
(alteration in original) (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814)); Guckin v.
Nagle, 259 F. Supp. 2d 406, 412 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that a private cause
of action is a prerequisite for finding federal question jurisdiction).
78. 154 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998).
79. Id. at 1283-84.
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provide certain federal causes of action.80 Had the plaintiff been
seeking an injunction, instead of damages, there would have been no
question that federal question jurisdiction existed because the statute
created a federal cause of action for an injunction.81
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in Nicodemus v. Union Pacific
Corp.,82 refused to exert jurisdiction over a case dealing with
a federally created railroad right of way. 83  The court first
acknowledged the existence of federal question jurisdiction for a
"substantial[ly] disputed question of federal law." 84 However, the
court then said that, despite the federal interest in what became of the
right of way, the absence of congressional intent to provide a federal
forum is "fatal" under Merrell Dow.
85
The problem with any test that finds federal jurisdiction only
where there is a federally-created cause of action is that it necessarily
80. Id. at 1283.
81. Id. There is some support for the argument that there should be subject
matter jurisdiction over statutes that create a cause bf action, even if the litigant
does not rely particularly on that portion of the cause of action. Fermin v.
Moriarty, No. 96 Civ. 3022 (MBM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13,367 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 2003); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§ 5.2.3 (4th ed. 2003); cf Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514 (11 th Cir.
2000) (finding subject matter jurisdiction, because, among other things, federal
RICO laws do create a cause of action, even though the plaintiff relied on
Georgia RICO law that does not create the cause of action).
However, Jairath stands as direct authority against such a proposition.
See 154 F.3d at 1283-84 (finding that even though the Americans with
Disabilities Act creates a cause of action for an injunction, the fact that it does
not create a cause of action for damages is fatal to the claim of federal
jurisdiction). This seems like the stronger argument, given that Congress's
intent is subverted just as much, if not more, where it has made the intentional
choice not to create a federal cause of action for certain portions of a
statute -expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
It is completely rational to distinguish between the two cases on the
basis of congressional intent. However, it is difficult to argue that the goals of
federal question jurisdiction are served by distinguishing between the two
cases. For example, if there are federal interests in adjudicating an injunction
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, it is not clear why there is less of a
federal interest where damages were at stake.
82. 318 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2003).
83. Id. at 1233.
84. Id. at 1236.
85. Id. at 1238. It should be noted however that the court did go on to
discuss one additional factor in its decision factoring in favor towards state
court jurisdiction, that is, that the cause of action was essentially a property and
tort question, issues it considered "traditionally relegated to state law." Id.
1457
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1443
ignores the fact that Merrell Dow does not explicitly overrule Smith.
Further, the footnote in the majority opinion at least implicitly
sanctions Smith jurisdiction by stating that there are some issues
important enough to merit jurisdiction even without a federal cause
of action.
86
This position is especially untenable in light of the Supreme
Court's post-Merrell Dow decisions in Christianson v. Colt
Industrial Operating Corp.87 and City of Chicago v. International
College of Surgeons,8 which both referred to a test for substantial
federal questions that went far beyond American Well Works.89
However, it appears that some courts are still commonly applying
this test.
While it is intriguing that some courts still use the American
Well Works language, it is more important to realize that courts are
hesitant to find substantial federal questions where there is no
indication that Congress felt the issue was deserving of federal
resources. As a result, a good number of the cases that "arise under"
the laws of the United States do so only because Congress expressly
decreed it.
90
b. ad-hoc substantiality test
Despite such concerns, most courts read federal question
jurisdiction to go beyond federal causes of action, even after Merrell
Dow. Such a flexible test is implicitly encouraged by Merrell Dow;
91
indeed, this is the case by case determination of the nature of the
federal issue that Justice Brennan predicted would result from the
majority's formulation of the rule in Merrell Dow.
92
86. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814-15 n.12
(1986).
87. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
88. 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
89. Both cases state that there is federal question jurisdiction where "the
plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law." See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808; City of Chicago,
522 U.S. at 163-64.
90. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808.
91. Id. at 814 (recognizing the need for "careful judgments about the
exercise of federal judicial power in an area of uncertain jurisdiction").
92. Id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some courts explicitly
recognize that they are doing a sort of balancing of the relevant factors. The
Ninth Circuit stated that its test was a weighing of a "complex group of
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On the other hand, Merrell Dow also counsels that such cases
must be limited.93 The First Circuit recognized this when it said:
* The Supreme Court has periodically affirmed [substantiality
as a basis for federal question jurisdiction] in the abstract,
occasionally cast doubt upon it, rarely applied it in practice,
and left the very scope of the concept unclear. Perhaps the
best one can say is that this basis endures in principle but
should be applied with caution and various qualifications.
94
It is this tension with which the lower courts have struggled. Most
courts have come to accept that the federal courts have jurisdiction
over substantial federal questions, but the courts are far from uniform
regarding what they consider substantial.
When a court finds a substantial federal question, it has
generally found two factors to be present in the case: the federal
question both plays a significant role in the litigation and implicates
some larger federal interest. If both are not present to some degree,
it is not likely that the court will find a substantial federal question.
95
Because of the flexibility of the test, it is up to litigants to suggest
that a particular combination of these factors and rationales for
extending jurisdiction either cuts in favor of or against federal
question jurisdiction.
i. dominance of the federal question in the present litigation
The first factor examines the importance of the interpretation of
federal law to the litigation before the court. This approach derives
support from the Court's statement in Merrell Dow that the federal
factors." See Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs. Inc., 340 F.3d 1033,
1042-43 (9th Cir. 2003). However, most courts do this more subconsciously.
93. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813-14 ("What is needed is something of that
common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which
characterizes the law in its treatment of causation.., a selective process which
picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside."
(quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936))).
94. Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
95. See, e.g., D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 258 F.3d 93, 103-04 (2d Cir.
2001) (finding federal question jurisdiction because (a) the case could not be
resolved without interpretation of the scope of defendant's duties under federal
law and (b) the case concerned the securities industry, a matter of "intense
federal concern").
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issue "must be in the forefront of the case and not collateral,
peripheral, or remote."
96
Of course, the federal question cannot be merely frivolous; there
must be some federal question for the court to litigate. 97 However,
courts will often weigh how determinative the federal issue is going
to be. Therefore, federal question jurisdiction would be appropriate
where the case turns on the federal question, or where the person's
right to recover will succeed on one interpretation of the federal issue
and fail under another.
98
96. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813 n.l 1 (quoting Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurtur, J., dissenting)).
Note that this is different from the constitutional power of Congress to add
jurisdictional provisions in a federal statute; for example, as shown above, the
federal question in most cases brought under the Air Transportation Safety Act
would be quite peripheral. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
97. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)
(finding no federal jurisdiction where the federal question raised is frivolous or
foreclosed by a prior decision).
98. See, e.g., Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 340 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.
2003) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claim under
California's Unfair Competition Law did not require that he prove a violation
of any federal law); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Drain, 191 F.3d 552
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because
the reasonableness of an easement could be determined without regard to the
federal standard). But see, e.g., Battle v. Seibels Bruce Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 596
(4th Cir. 2002) (finding federal jurisdiction where the resolution of the state
contract dispute would turn on whether a federal insurance statute in question
had an implied good faith requirement); U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins,
281 F.3d 383, 391 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the federal question
jurisdiction was appropriate because had they decided the federal issue the
other way, the case would have been dismissed); D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock
Exch., 258 F.3d 93, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding federal question
jurisdiction because the case could only be resolved by interpreting federal
securities law).
The notion of using this "construction" test is somewhat disturbing.
Cases that weigh either the "outcome determinative" or the "essentially
foreclosed" nature of the question often cite or refer to Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824), which said that federal
question jurisdiction is constitutional if the "right... may be defeated by one
construction of the... law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
construction." Id. at 822. This is troubling given that this test originally
described the broader constitutional test for federal question jurisdiction, not
the statutory test. While the two tests have similar goals, the constitutional test
is substantially broader, suggesting that this might not be an adequate ground
for § 1331 jurisdiction. But no court has shirked away from this factor on that
basis.
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The Supreme Court has indicated some support for this
interpretation. The Court, in Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp.,99 said that where a plaintiff's right to relief is
supported by alternate theories, each one of those theories must
involve a substantial federal question.100 The Court essentially held
that if each theory does not have a substantial federal question, then
the outcome may very well not turn on federal law at all.'0 '
Where this is the main factor in finding jurisdiction, litigants are
appealing to the efficient use of judicial resources rather than to the
protectionist purposes of federal question jurisdiction. As seen
above, litigants are arguing that because the federal courts cannot
take every case, they should take cases where their decisions will
affect the outcomes, whether the cases will further any given federal
policy or not. A plaintiff who wants to avoid federal court
jurisdiction therefore will phrase the claim in ways that make federal
law seem peripheral.
ii. nature of federal policy implicated in federal question
While this first factor examines the importance of the federal
question to the parties in the lawsuit, the second examines the
importance of the federal question, not to the litigants themselves,
but to any federal interests involved. This is taken explicitly from
the Merrell Dow majority's footnote, which promotes use of the
nature of the federal interest to determine whether a federal question
99. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
100. Id. at 810. But see Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access
Transmission Servs. Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) ("The
resolution of each issue need not depend completely upon an interpretation of
federal law.").
101. One court has fashioned a three-pronged balancing test for determining
whether the federal question is prominent enough in the case to confer
jurisdiction; the test makes the prominence of the federal issue the only real
consideration. See Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 917 (5th Cir.
2001). The three prongs articulated by the Fifth Circuit are as follows: (1) the
federal right must be "an essential element of the state claim;" (2)
"interpretation of the federal right is necessary to resolve the case" and the
interpretation will affect the outcome of the case; and (3) "the question of
federal law is substantial." Id. Although this third prong would appear to
throw the court into an endless spiral, it appears from the opinion that by
substantial, the court meant how predominant the federal issue was within the
case. Id. at 919.
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is substantial. 10 2  Courts recognize that limited federal judicial
resources should be spent on cases that have larger federal
ramifications-either that they protect interests that the federal
government has deemed substantial or that they further the purposes
of federal question jurisdiction.
Of course, determining the nature of a federal question itself
creates problems akin to substantiality. In Merrell Dow, the majority
distinguished Smith and Moore by drawing a distinction between
deciding the constitutionality of a state law and interpreting a federal
statute as the standard in a state negligence claim.10 3 The first was
deemed to be substantial, while the second was not. However,
subsequent decisions have not strictly followed the distinction
between constitutional and statutory questions.
There are several federal interests that could be implicated in
any case. The first is a general interest in a "correct" interpretation
of federal law. This presumes that the federal courts are uniquely
situated, by virtue of their special expertise in federal law, to protect
federal interests that Congress has deemed significant. 1°4  The
presumption is that federal courts will deal with so many
complicated cases in the area of, for example, ERISA, that they will
naturally interpret ERISA better than a state judge who may see
ERISA rarely. 10 5 There is also a presumption that an elected state
judge will be unlikely to eschew state policies and further the federal
goal Congress intended. 10 6  Finally, there is a federal interest in
102. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986).
103. Id. For criticism of drawing the line at constitutionality, see Note, supra
note 69, at 2288. The author points out that the interpretation of statutes may
have far-reaching effects, while striking down a state law as unconstitutional
may affect only a small proportion of people. Id. However, it seems relatively
safe to say that there is a stronger federal interest in most constitutional issues
than there is in most questions of statutory interpretation.
104. See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business
Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian
Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REv. 1769, 1774 (1992). However, this notion has
been criticized; from the very beginning, our federal court system has invited
state courts to play a role in interpreting federal law. See Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
105. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826-27.
106. State court judges are bound by federal law just as federal court judges
are, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987), and several Supreme
Court cases have expressed confidence in the ability of state court judges to
responsibly protect federal policies. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
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having a uniform system of federal law, as opposed to fifty different
state court interpretations. 0 7 If any of these issues are of special
concern in a case, the court may be more likely to take jurisdiction.
In addition, the federal government at times has an interest in
litigation, even in the absence of a specific interest in the
interpretation of the law itself. For example, courts have found
substantial issues of federal law where there is a case implicating
foreign relations. 10 8 There are also cases finding a substantial federal
question where the United States or its agencies are a party to the
litigation, 0 9 or where some other federal program or interest is
117 (1985). However, there is a historical concern that state court judges will
not sufficiently protect federal policies. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Exploring
the "Myth of Parity" in State Taxation: State Court Decisions Interpreting
Public Law 86-272, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 205, 214-16 (2003).
107. See, e.g., U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 391 (3d
Cir. 2002). But see Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 816 (finding that the availability
of United States Supreme Court review cut against this particular justification
for finding jurisdiction). Several courts have used this as a justification for
narrowing the range of federal question jurisdiction; they presume that if the
state court's interpretation of federal law turns out to be unpalatable, the
Supreme Court can always review the case and reverse the state court's
interpretation. See id. at 816 n.14. While this argument is theoretically true,
the limited number of cases the Supreme Court hears, and the even more
minimal number of those cases that originate in state court, make it unlikely
that the Supreme Court will fix any given state court interpretation of federal
law, even if it disagrees with it. See Note, supra note 69, at 2286.
108. Compare Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir.
1998) (finding a substantial federal question because the case implicated the
federal common law of foreign relations), with Patrickson v. Dole Food Co.,
251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a state tort claim did not raise a
substantial federal question merely because foreign relations might be
implicated). See generally Erin Elizabeth Terrell, Foreign Relations and
Federal Questions: Resolving the Judicial Split on Federal Court Jurisdiction,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1637 (2002) (describing the current split in the
circuits regarding whether cases implicating foreign relations necessarily raise
a federal question).
109. See Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding
that, on a spectrum between Smith and Moore, see supra note 63, this case was
substantial because the case turns on a contractual obligation to the United
States); Montana v. Abbot Labs., 266 F. Supp. 2d 250 (D. Mass. 2003)
(holding that subject matter jurisdiction existed because the case required
interpretation of a contract to which the United States was a party). There
is a separate statute, 28 U.S.C § 1442(a)(1) (2000), providing automatic
jurisdiction in cases where a federal official or agency is a party to the suit.
However, in situations where the federal government may not be a direct party
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implicated.'" 0 Other courts have found a substantial federal question
where two conflicting federal interests or rights must be weighed."'
While none of these fall under a technical definition of arising under
a federal law, there is little doubt that a federal court is more likely to
find substantiality where there is some federal interest, even where
there is essentially no federal law involved.
iii. substantiality of a state's interests
The most important factor that will cut against federal question
jurisdiction is a state's interest in the case. The federal courts realize
that decisions regarding jurisdiction require an eye towards comity,
because if the federal question is deemed to be substantial, several
state court issues might also come under the court's jurisdiction!."
2
The reasons why a state may have a particular interest in litigation
to the suit, litigants can still argue that there is still a substantial federal
question under this line of cases.
110. See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access
Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1278 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (considering
the fact that the case implicated the decision of the Public Service
Commission, a federal agency, in granting jurisdiction); D'Alessio v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., 258 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that subject matter
jurisdiction existed because regulation of the sale of securities on the New
York Stock Exchange was important to our nation's economy); Olguin Arroyo
v. State Election Bd., 30 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D.P.R. 1998) (finding that the
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is a substantial federal
issue).
111. See, e.g., Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2003)
(asserting federal question jurisdiction where a person was fired for putting a
Confederate flag on his tool box after an African-American employee
complained about the flag, because it involved a decision between one
person's First Amendment right to "free speech" and another person's
statutory right to a harassment-free workplace); Higgins, 281 F.3d at 391
(stating that the clash between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a
decision of the Court of Appeals in the area of admiralty is substantial, both
because of the importance of the Federal Rules, as well as the need for a
uniform system of admiralty).
112. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809 n.5. See infra Part IV.B for a
discussion of the rules regarding supplemental jurisdiction over state claims
that accompany federal question claims. It is sufficient here to mention that
supplemental jurisdiction rules allow a vast majority of related state claims to
be heard by the federal court.
The other place where this rule is apparent is in the context of
preemption, which pays significantly more attention to the state interests
involved than does the pure substantiality test. See infra Part III.D.
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are similar to those of the federal government. The state has an
interest in interpreting its own law, because the state wants to protect
the interest its legislature desired to advance by passing the law.
113
This is especially true where there are novel or complex issues of
state law. 114 Furthermore, a case may implicate state interests, i.e.,
the State or its agencies may be a party in interest.
115
Where these interests are present and there is no strong federal
interest, the case should be remanded. 1 6 Courts have said that it is a
greater evil for a federal court to assume jurisdiction over a case it
should not have, than for a state court to hear a case that could have
been heard in federal court. 1 7 This reflects a general preference for
state courts in close cases.' 18 One reason for this is that when a state
court hears an issue of federal law, it is subject to the review of the
U.S. Supreme Court. On the other hand, if a federal court speaks out
on a state law issue, the state court cannot review the federal court's
decision in that case; the only recourse is to refuse to follow that
precedent in future cases.
113. See generally Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts,
Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional
Challenges to Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381
(explaining the sensitivity to state interests necessary where the federal courts
interpret state legislation).
114. In recognition of this, a federal court may decline to exert jurisdiction
over supplemental state law claims where they raise complex or novel areas of
state law. See infra Part IV.D.1.
115. This gets into the question of sovereign immunities in federal court. If
a state is a party to the suit, Eleventh Amendment problems will be more of a
barrier to suit in federal court than federal question jurisdiction will be.
116. See, e.g. Quintal v. New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, No. 03-
10544-RWZ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,386, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2003)
(remanding because of lack of jurisdiction; while the plaintiff claimed that the
case turned on a constitutional question related to federal income tax, the court
said that "there is simply no federal interest" in adjudicating the argument
between an employer and employee).
Litigants need to keep this doctrine separate from abstention doctrines.
Abstention is not jurisdictional, but does appeal to a state's interest in a case to
argue that a court should not hear a case. Under abstention, the litigant argues
that a state's interests are so great that the court should abstain from hearing
the case, even though there is jurisdiction. See generally MULLENIX ET AL.,
supra note 16, § 13.02 (discussing abstention).
117. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 273, 323 (1993).
118. See id. at 322-24.
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3. Well-pleaded complaint rule
This is really only half of the § 1331 rule, because all cases that
pass the substantial federal question test above will not necessarily
be afforded federal jurisdiction. There is a judicially-created
requirement that there will be no federal question jurisdiction under §
1331 unless the federal question arises in the plaintiffs "well-
pleaded complaint." 119  The case cited for this proposition is
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley.120 In Mottley, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had violated a contract by
refusing to provide the plaintiffs with lifetime passes to ride the
railroad. 12' They believed that the defendant would claim that they
cancelled the Mottleys' passes to comply with a federal law
prohibiting such passes. Therefore, the Mottleys argued in their
complaint that this defense was not valid. 1
22
The Court said that there was no federal question jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs "well-pleaded" complaint would contain only
allegations that went to the contract dispute, and therefore the federal
question did not really "arise" until the defendant explained in its
answer why it had failed to honor the lifetime passes. 12  The Court
said that this was not enough. A federal court will only have federal
question jurisdiction when a substantial federal question appears on
the face of the plaintiff's claim.
124
There are several rationales cited in favor of this rule. The first
rationale commonly asserted is that jurisdiction can be determined
from the outset; the court does not need to wait until the defendants
have filed their answers to determine jurisdiction. 125 Second, the rule
119. Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy:
Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 662 (1987).
120. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
121. Id. at 150.
122. Id. at 153.
123. Id. at 152-53.
124. Id.
125. Technically, the court may not even be able to compel an answer unless
it has jurisdiction to do so. See Ragazzo, supra note 117, at 318.
Some may question the sincerity of this argument given the fact that the
current test puts the decision about jurisdiction in so much doubt. If the goal
was truly to determine jurisdiction from the beginning of the litigation, the rule
would be much simpler and more clear-cut. On the other hand, there is no
reason to exacerbate the uncertainty problem by waiting for defendants to
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supposedly allows the plaintiff to remain the master of the complaint,
making jurisdiction a product only of what the plaintiff decides to
put in the complaint. 126 Finally, in a pragmatic sense, the rule limits
the number of cases that can be brought in federal court. While this
is not necessarily a "good" rationale the Supreme Court has said that
the well-pleaded complaint rule does limit the number of cases
removable to federal court, which expresses a "'[d]ue regard for the
rightful independence of state governments' in interpreting their
own law.
127
However, most of the rationales for the rule are rather weak. In
fact, when considered in light of the purposes of federal question
jurisdiction-that is federal court expertise, comity, and protective
interest in federal law-there is no reason why these purposes would
not be served just as well by federal defenses as by federal claims.
128
That said, no court has expressed any doubt about the future of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.
The rule, then, is rather simple: a court can find a substantial
federal question only in the plaintiff's well-pleaded statement of her
own claim. 129 Anything that the defendant may add in the answer is
not relevant to jurisdiction. 130 Even where the plaintiff anticipates in
the complaint any defense that the defendant may raise or where the
parties agree that the only issue of contention is the validity of a
federal defense, this still does not satisfy the requirements of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.
choose their defense. For a good discussion of the pros and cons of the well-
pleaded complaint rule, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, § 5.2, and Redish,
supra note 104, at 1794-97.
126. Of course, the plaintiff is only the master of the complaint to a certain
extent. For example, if the plaintiff wants to include the federal defense, the
court will still not consider this for purposes of finding jurisdiction.
127. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826, 832 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941)).
128. Doemberg, supra note 119, at 663. One possible justification that is not
often mentioned is that the plaintiff has an automatic check on jurisdiction in
that non-meritorious claims will likely be dismissed. On the other hand, there
is no similar mechanism to check the action of the defendant; the plaintiff
ordinarily does not move to dismiss a particular defense, but merely disproves
it at trial. See Tristin K. Green, Complete Preemption-Removing the Mystery
from Removal, 86 CAL. L. REv. 363, 369 (1998).
129. See Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152-153.
130. See id.
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There are a few permutations of the rule that should be
mentioned. The first is that a plaintiff may not avoid the effect of the
rule by filing a declaratory judgment.' 3  For example, in the Mottley
case above, the defendants could not have filed a lawsuit asking the
federal court to declare that their actions were warranted under the
federal statute. 132 This would only serve to circumvent the well-
pleaded complaint rule, because the Mottleys could not have brought
that suit.
133
The rule is not always clear-cut because either party can ask for
a declaratory judgment as to its rights or responsibilities, for
example, under a contract.134 Therefore, not all litigants requesting
declaratory relief are immediately prohibited from federal question
jurisdiction. The question for courts, then, is not who is bringing the
suit, but rather, what form it would take as a coercive lawsuit, and
whether the federal question is really brought as a claim for relief or
as a defense to liability.' 35 For example, in Household Bank, F.S.B.
v. JFS Group,136 the plaintiffs brought a declaratory suit against
certain people who had opted out of a class action suit against the
plaintiffs. 137 The class action suit was brought under the Truth in
Lending Act.' 38 The court found that there was jurisdiction, based
on the fact that the plaintiffs in the declaratory suit could have been
plaintiffs in a coercive suit against those who had brought the
declaratory suit.
139
131. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
132. Id.
133. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000), the statute
that permits litigants to request that a court declare the rights of the parties,
cannot serve as a federal question either. The statute is merely procedural and
does not confer any substantive rights. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
134. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19
n.19, 20 n.20 (1983).
135. Another way this is often phrased is whether the suit could have been
brought if there was no declaratory judgment remedy. Skelley Oil Co., 339
U.S. at 671; see also Robin E. Dieckmann, Federal Jurisdiction Over
Declaratory Judgment Suits-Federal Preemption of State Law, 1986 U. ILL.
L. REv. 127.
136. 320 F.3d 1249 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
137. Id. at 1251-52.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1257-58.
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In addition, when looking to a plaintiff's complaint, a court may
only look at the original plaintiff, not at all parties in an offensive
position in the suit, i.e., counterclaimants or cross claimants. In
2002, in Holmes Group, Inc., v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
Inc., 14 the plaintiff filed a complaint with the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that Holmes' product infringed on
its patent.141  Holmes then filed a claim seeking a declaratory
judgment stating that it had not infringed on Vornado's patent, and
sought an injunction to stop Vornado from accusing it of trade-dress
infringement in any public materials. 42  Vornado then filed a
counterclaim, essentially duplicating the complaint it had filed with
the ITC.
143
The Court held that even when the defendant takes the offensive
position by filing a counterclaim, a federal claim stated therein is not
sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction on the court. 44 The
Supreme Court was concerned that this would take control over
jurisdiction out of the hands of plaintiffs. 145 The Court was also
concerned that this would undermine the well-pleaded complaint rule
as a "'quick rule of thumb' for determining (and limiting)
jurisdiction.
146
Although there are very specific laws related to patent
jurisdiction, later cases confirmed that a counterclaim can never
140. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
141. Id. at 827-28.
142. Id. at 828. It should be mentioned that even though this arose under the
jurisdictional statute providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for patent claims,
the standards are the same as under § 1331. See Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (stating that "[1]inguistic
consistency" requires that the same test apply to jurisdiction arising under the
patent law as jurisdiction arising under any other law of the United States).
143. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 828. This was a compulsory counterclaim under
Rule 13(a) because the claim "ar[ose] out of the transaction or occurrence" as
the original claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
144. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 831.
145. Id. at 826, 831-32.
146. Id. at 832 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). Again, this seems somewhat odd. Normally
courts do not choose a rule only because it is easy to apply, and certainly, in
the area of federal question jurisdiction, courts have foregone other quick rules
of thumb, i.e., "a claim arises under the law that creates the right of action."
See supra Part III.C. 1.
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serve as the basis of jurisdiction, even in non-patent litigation. 147
Therefore, the federal courts only have federal question jurisdiction
where the plaintiffs "well-pleaded complaint" raises substantial
federal questions.
148
4. The effect of § 1331 and the well-pleaded complaint
rule on litigants
The rule, then, is that there is federal jurisdiction where a well-
pleaded complaint reveals a claim brought under a federal statute that
either creates a cause of action or raises a substantial federal
question. The movement of the courts towards this more flexible
reading of federal question jurisdiction impacts litigants greatly.
First, with such a great variety of factors, it is very difficult for the
parties to predict whether a particular court will find any particular
federal issue "substantial."' 149 This means that fighting jurisdiction is
147. See, e.g., Integra Bank, N.A. v. Greer, No. IP 4:02-CV-244 B/H, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,580 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2003) (applying the rule to
mortgage foreclosure); United Mut. Houses, L.P. v. Andujar, 230 F. Supp. 2d
349 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying the rule in a landlord-tenant dispute). The rule
in Holmes has also been expanded by at least one court to cover third party
claims. See Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2003).
148. One possible impact of this case is that both the patent infringer and the
patent owner will have strong motivation to try to file their patent claim before
the other one can. This problem arises because of the unique appeal process of
appeals in patent infringement cases and the advantages of litigation in the
federal circuit court versus the federal district court. For more information on
forum shopping and patent infringement after Holmes, see Christian A. Fox,
On Your Mark, Get Set, Go! A New Race to the Courthouse Sponsored by
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation System, Inc., 2003 BYU L.
REv. 331.
149. Some have expressed concern with such an ad-hoc process for
determining jurisdiction. See Note, supra note 69, at 2280. This is especially
true because Smith cases are overturned on appeal with greater frequency then
the general rate of reversal on appeal. See id. If an appeals court reverses a
decision based on lack of jurisdiction, anything else that the lower court may
have decided becomes moot. See id. This can lead to significant time and
effort spent on issues that the parties will have to re-litigate in state court. See
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1988)
(discussing the waste to litigants of having such an unpredictable rule of
federal question jurisdiction).
On the other hand, the fact that Smith cases make up such a small
portion of the federal docket, and that such loose tests are constantly applied in
other areas of the law (e.g., the "reasonable" test for negligence), cut against
any such problem. See Note, supra note 69, at 2280.
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a much more costly and lengthy process, and the party who wants to
be in state court (often the plaintiff) must take this into account.
Normally, if the defendant removed a case to federal court, the
plaintiff would need to weigh the costs of fighting for a remand
against two things-the probability of success on the jurisdiction
question and the advantage gained by staying in state court. By
raising the length and cost of litigation, and by throwing the
probability of success into question, the current test means that the
advantage of litigating in federal court must be significant before it
will be worthwhile for the plaintiff to challenge jurisdiction.
The second result is that a plaintiff cannot avoid litigation
merely by omitting federal causes of action, as the plaintiff could
under the American Well Works test. This puts more control in the
hands of the defendant to argue that federal questions exist.
This leads to a significant advantage for defendants. A
defendant may gain some advantage because the test takes longer
and is more costly to litigate. Defendants can also have an advantage
because it becomes less likely that plaintiffs will challenge
jurisdiction at all. Finally, there is an advantage to defendants
because the test will land many more cases in federal court, which
defendants tend to prefer.
In light of this, what can litigants do? This question requires
examination of the doctrine of "artful pleading." The term artful
pleading is used by courts in several contexts without any precise
definition, but it generally refers to any attempt by a plaintiff to take
advantage of its initial control over the pleading to characterize its
claim in state law terms, with the goal of avoiding federal
jurisdiction. For the purposes of this section, that means taking one's
claim and phrasing it so as not to raise any substantial federal
questions.150
Where a plaintiff has chosen to articulate its claims in state law
terms, but it is clear that resolution of the case will involve federal
law to some extent, the court will have to sort out whether the issue
deserves federal resources. Courts have often repeated that "a
plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary
150. It oversimplifies things greatly to say that plaintiff will always want to
be in state court. Because most of the cases in this area arise in that context,
the focus is on that strategy here. However, most of these strategies could be
used in reverse by the plaintiff who wanted to artfully plead into federal court.
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federal questions in a complaint."'151 One court called the artful
pleading doctrine "a useful procedural sieve to detect traces of
federal subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case."
' 152
The problem is determining how much power the court has to
"alchemize a state claim into a federal claim" when the plaintiff has
chosen not to do so.153 The Supreme Court has said that jurisdiction
cannot be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced.
154
However, in reality most courts use the plaintiffs complaint as a
starting place. From there, the courts (at the defendant's urging) go
on to look for the presence of any of the factors that apply that can
make a federal question "substantial" - whether federal law is going
to be important to the plaintiffs claim or whether other federal
interests are implicated. This system gives very little deference to
the plaintiff's own characterization of the case, other than perhaps
for the fact that the plaintiff gets the first chance to characterize the
case. "Although a court should give some deference to a plaintiffs
chosen forum, 'it should not allow a plaintiff to deny a defendant a
federal forum simply by labeling his federal issues as state causes of
action." 155
There is a limit however. If the plaintiff can possibly state its
cause of action without reference to federal law, the court should not
force it to rephrase its cases just to strengthen its claim. Where the
difference is marginal, and the plaintiff believes that it has a better
chance in state court than in federal court with federal claims, the
plaintiff should not have to plead federal causes of action. Only
where the plaintiff cannot possibly state a claim without federal law
should the federal courts step in and take jurisdiction.156
151. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22.
152. Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2003).
153. Id. at 1042.
154. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 (1986).
155. Olguin Arroyo v. State Election Bd., 30 F. Supp. 2d 183, 186 (D.P.R.
1998).
156. For example, in Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1033, the Court rejected
defendant's accusation of artful pleading. The plaintiff did not have to rely on
federal law to make a claim, even though it may have made his claim stronger.
The court distinguished Lippitt from a case where the court did find artful
pleading. In Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass 'n of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998), the court said that jurisdiction was proper
where plaintiff sued NASDAQ for breach of contract after they de-listed her
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How do plaintiffs artfully plead? A plaintiff trying to avoid
federal court must both avoid federal causes of action and avoid
raising substantial federal questions. The above section laid out the
various claims a court is likely to consider substantial, and in light of
these categories, the plaintiff must avoid claims that center around
such substantial questions. The plaintiff must also take care to
highlight any interest the state may have in adjudicating the suit.
Given all the uncertainty regarding the various factors and tests
that are currently applied, plaintiffs trying to artfully plead have to
walk a fine line; they must take care not to plead federal questions
too pervasively, but still take advantage of any provisions in the
federal law that may be advantageous to their cases. The question of
how much substantive federal law a plaintiff can take advantage of
while still staying in state court is very difficult.
However, it is important to see that even if the plaintiff is
"caught" omitting a necessary federal question, it may still be to its
advantage to plead federal questions sparingly. When a plaintiff
articulates a claim in state law terms, and the defendant realizes that
there may be a substantial federal question involved, the defendant is
in a difficult place. In order to remove the case, the defendant will
have to argue that without the federal law, the plaintiffs claim is
rather weak, or in a way, that the plaintiff's claim will be much
stronger under the federal law. The defendant is forced to make the
plaintiffs argument. This is a somewhat uncomfortable position to
have taken once the jurisdictional battle is over.
On the other hand, the plaintiff is still in a difficult position. By
articulating the claim purely in state law terms, it risks several things.
The plaintiff risks that the judge will believe it to be deceitful, and
that the judge will more carefully scrutinize anything else it does.
More importantly, it risks winning the battle but losing the war, i.e.,
remaining in state court with a case that is fatally weakened without
resort to federal law.
stock. Although the plaintiff had "carefully articulated" the breach of contract
claim to avoid potential federal questions, the question of delisting of stocks is
essentially controlled by federal law. Id. at 1212. Because proving a violation
by NASDAQ would require proof that NASDAQ had violated federal
securities law, the case would "turn on" federal law, and therefore, jurisdiction
was proper. Id. In Lippitt, however, the plaintiff could be made whole without
reference to federal law, therefore, there was no artful pleading.
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In summary, the artful pleading of substantial federal question
entails a strategic choice. The plaintiff must balance the advantages
of federal law against the liabilities, and decide how much federal
law is too much. In many cases, there will be nothing that the
plaintiff can do to avoid federal jurisdiction, but in close cases, the
plaintiffs choice of characterization may make a difference. All of
these factors play into the plaintiff's original calculus. A plaintiff
can take the original advantage in the federal question battle by
carefully choosing the phrasing of the arguments.
5. The intersection of "substantial federal questions" and success
on the merits
One important tactical point deserves a detour, that is, the
tension between the substantiality of a federal question, and the
success of the claim. Academically, these are two separate
questions. But litigants and courts sometimes have trouble applying
the distinction.1 57 If done by the book, the court should look at the
allegations in the complaint to see if they would raise a substantial
federal question as alleged. 158 This should be made independently of
"whether the claim ultimately [would] be held good or bad."' 159 If the
federal court finds jurisdiction, then it may consider whatever other
motions may determine the validity of a claim. For example, it can
then grant a summary judgment motion dismissing the claim. But if
the federal court does not have jurisdiction, it must remand the case
to state court for further consideration, and cannot make any
statement on the merits of the case.
Part of the problem is that the issues of jurisdiction and of
success on the merits are more interrelated than they may seem at
first glance. Because a plaintiff cannot state a federal claim that is
absolutely frivolous merely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction,
the court does have to weigh the validity of the federal law claim
even at the jurisdictional level. The purpose at that stage is to
determine whether the federal claim is absolutely frivolous, and to
157. See Carlson v. Principal Fin. Group, 320 F.3d 301, 305-06 (2d Cir.
2003) ("Whether a federal court possesses federal-question subject matter
jurisdiction and whether a plaintiff can state a claim for relief under a federal
statute are two questions that are easily, and often, confused.").
158. Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913).
159. Id. at25.
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remand the case if it is found to be absolutely meritless. 160 However,
the courts have held that the opposite is not true.' 6' If plaintiffs want
to plead so as to omit all potential federal issues and claims, they are
permitted to, even if it is for the sole purpose of avoiding federal
jurisdiction. This is true even if, without the federal claim, the claim
is meritless and will be immediately dismissed. 162 The problem is
that litigants sometimes get confused between the two, especially
where plaintiffs are forced to plead so close to the lines so as to try to
avoid federal court in areas of substantial federal control.
In some cases, confusion of the issue could lead to a substantial
advantage to one of the two parties. If there is a potentially viable
state claim, the defendant has a motivation to try to get the court to
dismiss the case on summary judgment on the merits. It would end
the litigation and make the issue res judicata in state court. On the
other side, the plaintiff would prefer that the court dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction or remand, because this would not have the same
preclusionary effects. Thus it is the responsibility of the party
fighting the dual motion to remand/motion to dismiss battle to ensure
that the court deals with the matters in the correct order. The burden
for the motion to remand is merely to show that the case is not
frivolous. 1
63
D. Aryiully Pleading in Areas of Potential Preemption
Another choice plaintiffs have is how to plead in areas of
complete preemption. Preemption is probably the area of federal
question jurisdiction that has most changed in recent years, and is
potentially the area of greatest uncertainty. The general idea is that
in some areas of the law, Congress has so completely taken over the
regulation that state law claims and remedies no longer exist and no
amount of artful pleading will allow the plaintiff to stay in state
court.
The first important point is that there are various types of
preemption. The first type of preemption is "conflict preemption."
160. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946).
161. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
162. See supra Part III.B (discussing artful pleading of only state law
claims).
163. See Carlson v. Principal Fin. Group, 320 F.3d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir.
2003).
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The basic premise of preemption follows from the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution.'1 4 When a federal court makes a law that is
constitutionally within its power to make, any state law in conflict
with that law is automatically void. 165  This is a conflict of
substantive laws, meaning that it is not actually possible to comply
with both federal and state law at the same time. 166  Conflict
preemption is generally a defense.' 67  A defendant who raises a
statute that preempts state law, but only to the level of conflict
preemption, will not be able to remove because of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 1
68
The second type of preemption, called complete preemption,
goes beyond the areas that actually conflict with state law. 169 Under
the doctrine of complete preemption, a state's law may be void even
though Congress has not taken any action that directly conflicts with
state law in that area.170  Complete preemption exists where
Congress has taken some other step to preclude state regulation of a
particular area.
The rationale for this is that Congress's intentions may be
thwarted just as much where the states provide a remedy that
Congress has chosen specifically not to provide, as where the state
law is in direct conflict with federal law. Take for example the
situation where Congress passes a statute permitting recovery of
compensatory damages, but not punitive damages. This may reflect
164. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also, 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722.1 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp.
2004).
165. Id.
166. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
167. WRIGHTETAL., supra note 164, § 3722.1.
168. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987); Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13, 26 (1983).
It is interesting to note that the current Court has generally read conflict
and "field" preemption statutes very narrowly in an effort to avoid a federal
take-over of state law. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225,
227-28 (2000). On the other hand, as is noted below, the test for jurisdictional
preemption sweeps more and more cases into a federal venue. See infra Part
III.D.2.
169. Courts sometimes call this "super-preemption" or "jurisdictional
preemption," and all three terms are used interchangeably in this Section.
170. 16 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 107.14[4][b][iii] (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003).
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a deliberate choice that federal policies are best served if plaintiffs
are not permitted to recover punitive damages in a certain suit.
Therefore, if the state has a statute that permits punitive damages in
this type of suit, federal policies are still hindered even though the
state law does not technically conflict with any federal law.
171
Where the courts find that the plaintiff's claims are completely
preempted by federal law, the defendant will be permitted to remove
the case to federal court. 17 2 The plaintiffs state law claim will be
transformed into a federal law claim, and the plaintiff may be given
the chance to amend the complaint to try to fit within the federal
statute. 173  This is a corollary of the artful pleading doctrine; no
matter how well the plaintiff couches the claims in state law terms,
the defendant will be able to remove on the basis of complete
preemption.' 
74
Because of the danger of stepping on the states' toes, the courts
have interpreted the reach of complete preemption rather
narrowly. 175  The federal courts recognize that states should be
permitted to supplement federal laws to conform to their own values
and policies. As such, courts are hesitant to find that federal law
completely preempts state law unless Congress has expressed some
171. See, e.g., Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1354
n. 11 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that the fact that plaintiff could not obtain
punitive damages under ERISA did not mean that his claim for punitive
damages was not preempted; "[i]f it did, any plaintiff could thwart Congress's
intent to completely preempt claims arising out of the denial of ERISA benefits
by artful pleading.").
172. There are two possible explanations why removal under complete
preemption is not limited by the well-pleaded complaint rule. The first is that
complete preemption is actually the purest form of artful pleading; there is
simply no more state law under which to artfully plead. In that case,
preemption looks less like a defense to a state claim and more like artful
pleading. The second is that all preemption is a defense, and complete
preemption is merely a judicially-created exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule.
173. See, e.g., Krispin v. May Dep't Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th
Cir. 2000).
174. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 2064
(2003) ("[T]here is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against
a national bank.").
175. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-65 (1987).
1477
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37:1443
intention that federal law control the area and that the cases be heard
solely in federal court.
176
From the outset, one of the confusing parts of this law is that the
term "preemption" has varied uses and often the courts are not
specific about exactly which meaning of preemption they are
using.177 Often there may be questions of conflict and complete
preemption within the same statute. Because the two statutes have
similar goals, there is some overlap, and the amount to which certain
tests will crossover is also unclear.
178
1. Development of the complete preemption doctrine
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735179 was the first case where
the Supreme Court found federal question jurisdiction based on
complete preemption. The plaintiffs sued the defendant union to
enjoin the union members from striking.is Plaintiffs based their suit
on a "no-strike" provision in the contract.' 81 The defendant removed
the case to federal court.' 82 The Supreme Court held that § 301 of
176. Darcangelo v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 194 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("[F]ederalism concerns strongly counsel against imputing to
Congress an intent to preempt large swaths of state law absent some clearly
expressed direction." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
177. See Sonoco Prods. Co v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366,
371 (4th Cir. 2003).
178. A good example of this is the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
188 (2000). Several federal courts accepted that the Railway Labor Act
completely preempted the area of labor management for railroad employees
and based their argument on a Supreme Court case, Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994). See, e.g., Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d
944, 949 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding complete preemption based on the holding in
Hawaiian Airlines). However, one circuit recently held that the Railway Labor
Act did not completely preempt. Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349,
1355-57 (1 1th Cir. 2003). The court noted that Hawaiian Airlines was a case
heard by the Supreme Court on appeal from the Hawaii Supreme Court
through § 1291, and was not a federal question case at all. Id. at 1355. Thus,
the preemption analysis in Hawaiian Airlines was purely a conflict preemption
discussion, and yet, this case formed the basis of an almost unanimous
consensus that the Railway Labor Act did completely preempt state law. Id. at
1355-56.
179. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).




Summer 2004] FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
the Labor Management Relations Act provided federal jurisdiction
for putative violations of a collective bargaining agreement.1
83
Although this is often cited as the first example of preemption in
federal question jurisdiction, the word "preemption" is not
mentioned anywhere in the case. The Court based its decision on the
fact that § 301 suits are controlled by federal law, and that any claim
arising under § 301 therefore would arise under the laws of the
United States. 84 The Court concluded that "removal is but one
aspect of the 'primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions
of federal law."' 185  The decision is only five pages long and
subsequently sat largely untouched. It was only fifteen years later,
when the Supreme Court used Avco to explain preemption in another
context, that the Court finally gave an explanation of its holding.
186
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust,187 the defendants represented a vacation trust fund for
construction workers.' 88 The plaintiff tax board tried to collect back
taxes by levying taxes against the fund.' 89 The defendants removed
the case to federal court on the basis that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1964 (ERISA)'9 ' preempted state law on the
question of interpreting employee benefits.191
The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded to state court.
192
The Court recognized that certain provisions of ERISA might be
removable to federal court. 19 3 However, it held that the plaintiffs
claim was not removable because ERISA did not create a cause of
action for certain classes of litigants such as the tax board.' 94 ERISA
does create express causes of action for participants of the plan,
beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor, 195 but because
ERISA did not cover the plaintiff's action, the Court found that
183. Id. at 560.
184. Id. at 559-60.
185. Id. at 560.
186. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
187. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
188. Id. at 4-5.
189. Id. at 5-6.
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
191. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 7.
192. Id. at28.
193. Id. at24.
194. Id. at 27.
195. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); see Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24-25.
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Congress had not intended to preempt that kind of suit.' 96 Therefore,
the Court ordered that the case be remanded to state court for lack of
jurisdiction.
197
The Court also noted that ERISA law would affect the outcome
to the extent that the state law conflicted with federal law.
198
However, the Court held that conflict preemption is merely a
defense, which cannot give rise to federal question jurisdiction under
the well-pleaded complaint rule.
199
Franchise Tax Board is especially informative because the
Court explained its holding in Avco. The Supreme Court said that
"Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of action
completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that
comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
'arises under' federal law. ' 200 The Court explained that complete
preemption existed in Avco because the "pre-emptive force of § 301
[of the Labor Management Relations Act was]... so powerful as to
displace entirely any state cause of action" in the area of collective
bargaining.2° 1 As such, any state law claim that came within the
scope of the area covered by § 301 was completely preempted. In
addition, the Court found the distinguishing factor between Avco and
Franchise Tax Board was the fact that under the LMRA, the
plaintiffs state cause of action was replaced with a federal cause of
action.202 In contrast, in Franchise Tax Board, if the plaintiff's claim
had been completely preempted, the plaintiff would have had no
replacement cause of action because ERISA did not provide standing
for the state tax board to sue.
20 3
The next case that defined the limits of complete preemption
was Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor.204  Whereas
Franchise Tax Board had merely hinted that any cause of action that
arose out of ERISA's enforcement provision would be completely
196. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26-28.
197. Id. at 28.
198. Id. at 26.
199. Id. at 13, 26.
200. Id. at 23-24.
201. Id. at 23-26.
202. Id. at 25 n.28.
203. Id. at 26.
204. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
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preempted,20 5 Taylor explicitly says SO. 2 0 6 The Supreme Court said
that Congress "had clearly manifested [its] intent to make [all] causes
of action" in ERISA's § 502(a) enforcement provision "removable to
federal court. 20 7  When Congress expresses an intention to make
certain types of cases removable, the state claim is necessarily
federal and preemption is no longer a defense. As such, there is no
longer a well-pleaded complaint problem.
Obviously, this was useful for litigants' cases under ERISA's
civil enforcement section. However, because of the conflicting
rationales in Franchise Tax Board and Taylor, the lower federal
courts were not always clear about when to find complete
preemption outside of the two areas on which the Supreme Court had
already spoken. Taylor seemed to say that an exception was made
for ERISA based on the fact that Congress had designed it to act just
like the LMRA.208 But the Court did not completely explain why the
LMRA had the preemptional force necessary for removal. It was not
entirely clear what level of congressional intent the courts were
supposed to be looking for: congressional intent to make something
look like LMRA, or congressional intent to create a nebulous
preemptive force.
The Supreme Court did not find complete preemption in another
case until June 2003. In the meantime, the lower federal courts had
extended complete preemption to many other statutes. Most used
some form of a two or three-pronged test to determine where
Congress had created the preemptive force necessary to bring the
federal statute within the limits of Taylor.20 9 Some focused on, as
205. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24.
206. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66.
207. Id. Congress did not exactly hide its intent. The Court in Taylor noted
that when ERISA was passed, the preemption section was largely copied from
the preemption section in LMRA. Id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)
(preemption provision of the LMRA), with 29 U.S.C. 1132(f) (2000)
(preemption provision of ERISA). Furthermore, the sponsor of the ERISA bill
explicitly stated that "'[it is intended that such actions will be regarded as
arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought
under.., the Labor Management Relations Act."' Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66
(omission in original) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974)).
208. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66.
209. For a good summary of the different tests being utilized by the
circuits pre-Beneficial, see BLAB T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable
Communications, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 856-57 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
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Taylor had counseled, whether Congress had expressed the intention
that cases falling under the statute be removed.1 ° Others had
focused more on a broader congressional intent to create exclusive
remedies.2 " Still others looked for evidence of a more explicit link
between the statute in question and either the LMRA or ERISA.212
In 2003, in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,213 the
Supreme Court clarified and significantly altered the rules on
complete preemption. Twenty-six plaintiffs promised their tax
refund checks to defendants in order to obtain a short-term loan.
2 14
They then sued the defendant on several state law claims, asserting
that the interest rates charged on the loans were usurious.
2 15
Defendants removed the case, saying that claims regarding unfair
interest rates were completely preempted by the National Bank
Act.216 The Court found federal jurisdiction, holding that state usury
statutes were completely preempted by the National Bank Act.
21 7
The case adds three things to the understanding of preemption.
First, it adds the National Bank Act to the list of statutes that the
Supreme Court has affirmatively held completely preempts all state
law. Second, it shuts down the line of cases that had said that a
statute must look like LMRA or ERISA in order to merit complete
preemption. Third, it provides greater insight into a general rule of
complete preemption. It is this third purpose that is more important
for this Part.
To understand how Beneficial changed the preemption question,
it is necessary to understand why the Supreme Court found that the
210. See, e.g., id. at 859 n.3. In fact, several cases had explicitly said that the
intention to create an exclusive remedy was not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1046-47 (1 1th Cir.
2002), rev'd sub nom. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058
(2003).
211. See, e.g., Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d 1244, 1246-47 (11th
Cir. 2002).
212. See, e.g., Aaron v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1164 (5th
Cir. 1989) (finding that the plaintiff's claim was not completely preempted by
a federal statute where that statute did not have jurisdictional provisions
paralleling the LMRA).
213. 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003).
214. Id. at 2060-61.
215. Id. at 2061.
216. Id.
217. 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (2000).
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National Bank Act had the preemptive force necessary for complete
preemption. The Court said that there are two situations where
complete preemption exists: (1) where Congress has explicitly
provided that it should; and (2) where "a federal statute wholly
displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-
emption. ' 1 8
The first category covers federal statutes that expressly provide
for removal to federal court, even for claims brought under state law.
The example the Court gives is the Price-Anderson Act, which
provides federal jurisdiction for state-law tort claims arising out of
nuclear accidents.21 9
The second is much broader, including what is typically thought
of as "complete preemption" cases. The Court explicitly shuts down
the Taylor line of reasoning that required that Congress express some
intent to remove certain cases. 220 The Court said that instead of
focusing on whether Congress intended the cause of action to be
removable, the correct inquiry is whether Congress intended the
federal cause of action to be the exclusive cause of action for this
type of claim.221  The Court then examined the structure of the
218. Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2063.
219. Id. at 2062.
220. Id. at 2064 n.5. The Supreme Court gives one very practical reason for
not requiring indication of Congress's intent to remove. Many congressional
acts, including the National Bank Act, were passed before the general removal
statute or the well-pleaded complaint rule was in existence. To expect that
Congress would have included some statement about removal to get around the
well-pleaded complaint rule would be to expect the impossible. Id.
221. Id. at 2064. When the Eleventh Circuit decided that more than just an
exclusive federal remedy was necessary, it relied on Taylor. Anderson v. H&R
Block Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1046-47 (l1th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom.
Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2058. The Supreme Court in Taylor recognized that
ERISA provided the exclusive remedy for certain employee benefit cases, but
then said that it would be reluctant to find complete preemption solely on that
basis. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987). Rather, the
Court found that Congress had expressed a clear desire to make ERISA cases
heard in federal court based on the "close parallels" between the language of
the LMRA and ERISA. Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2067 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Eleventh Circuit and several other courts had relied on this
language to hold that an exclusive remedy was not sufficient to find complete
preemption. Anderson, 287 F.3d at 1047. Thus, there is a conflict in reasoning
between the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor and Beneficial that will have
to be dealt with by the lower federal courts as they review circuit precedent
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National Bank Act.222 The first clause, 12 U.S.C. § 85, provides a
substantive law of interest rates, describing how much any bank can
in~ 223charge in interest. 2 The Court said that this section would provide
only conflict preemption; any state that told banks that they could
charge more, or indeed less, than this would be preempted by federal
224law. However, the Court found that § 85 by itself would not be a
basis for removal.225
On the other hand, § 86 of the National Bank Act sets out
exactly what remedies are available to the person who has been
charged more interest than is permitted under § 85.226 The Court
then cited several cases that had held that usury was a question to be
determined by reference to federal law only and not state law; they
found this to be necessary to retain uniformity. 227 As such, the Court
decided that the plaintiffs claim was preempted because Congress
expressed sufficient intent that the National Bank, and in particular, §
86, was to be the sole remedy for usury claims.
2. General rule
There are basically two parts, then, of the rule, although they are
largely related. First, Congress must have intended the federal
statute to be the exclusive remedy for the type of claim that the
plaintiff has brought. Second, the plaintiff's claim must fit within
the preemptive scope of that statute. This next part examines each
inquiry in turn.
a. finding Congress's intent to preempt certain state laws
The first question involves Congress's intent to preempt a
particular area of the law. The Court has repeatedly said that
Congress's intent is the "touchstone" of the preemption inquiry.
228
However, as in all areas of the law, Congress's intent is a somewhat
nebulous concept. The best way to determine what is acceptable
under the Beneficial standard. See Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2067 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
222. Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2063-64.
223. Id. at 2063.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2063-64.
227. Id.
228. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 59, 66 (1987).
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evidence of intent is to look at the various statutes where the federal
courts have found the "preemptive force" necessary to confer
jurisdictional preemption.
i. using the language to determine Congress's intent
The starting place for the analysis is always the language in the
statute itself. The analysis is easiest where Congress has said that
certain actions are removable. For example, the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that certain "covered" class
actions based on state law claims are removable. 229 Though limited
in scope, this provision makes it clear that Congress intended those
cases that fall under the provision to be removable. 30 The Court
made it clear in Beneficial that where such a statement exists,
removal is permitted. It talked about the Price-Anderson Act, which
like SLUSA, expressly permits removal of any state law claim
arising out of a nuclear accident.231 The question of Congress's
intent to permit removal is not difficult when Congress writes into
the statute that cases are removable.
But complete preemption is not limited to statutes with this clear
statement of intent. For example, the federal courts generally agree
that § 301 (a) of the Copyright Act completely preempts state laws on
copyright, although it has no jurisdictional removal language. This
holding is based on two statutes that evidence Congress's intent to
completely preempt copyright law. First, § 301(a) of the Copyright
Act contains a broad "conflict" preemption clause, stating that all
rights granted by states that are "within the general scope of [the
subject of] copyright" and are equivalent to rights granted under the
Copyright Act are governed exclusively by the federal copyright
232statute. Second, there is a specific jurisdictional statute conferring
exclusive federal jurisdiction on the question of copyrights.233
229. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2) (2000). The removal provision acts only on
covered class actions, and only on claims of misrepresentation made in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. Id.
230. See, e.g., Patenaude v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 290 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2002).
231. Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2062.
232. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). Under the lower Beneficial test, this
statement stripping plaintiff of state claims would probably be sufficient to find
congressional intent of an exclusive cause of action.
233. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) (2000).
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Several courts have found that these two factors combine to create
complete preemption for any claim that falls under the limits of the
provision.
Even this indicium of congressional intent is not necessary; the
Court's two earliest statements on complete preemption dealt with
LMRA and ERISA, which both contain much less forceful language.
LMRA simply states that cases relating to collective bargaining
agreements "may be brought in... [federal] court. 235  Similarly,
ERISA contains language of conflict preemption, i.e., that state laws
in the area of employee benefits are "superseded," and that the
federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over certain claims.
236
These were both found to be sufficient.
The Court's most recent statement on the matter extended
complete preemption to the National Bank Act, a statute that has no
jurisdictional language at all. The Court in Beneficial expressly
orders federal courts not to require language regarding intent to
remove. 237 This makes it clear that SLUSA-type language is not
required, but does little to explain what indicia of congressional
intent will be required.
ii. determining Congress's intent post-Beneficial
If language is now sufficient but not required for complete
preemption, the question is how Beneficial will affect the way that
the lower federal courts look at congressional intent. It appears, on
234. See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs. Inc. 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993);
Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121-23 (N.D. Cal.
2001). Again, there are courts that have not settled the question. The
Pennsylvania District Court said that because it had other grounds to deny
jurisdiction, it refused to rule on the question of whether the Copyright Act had
the power of complete preemption. See County of Del. v. Gov't Sys., Inc., 230
F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
235. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
236. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Part of Justice Scalia's complaint about the
path that the majority took in Beneficial is the "flimsiness of its precedential
roots." Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2068 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia notes that
the Avco decision gave no justification for why the LMRA indicated
congressional intent to completely pre-empt, and that the only grounds for
finding ERISA preemption is to draw the connection between Congress's
intent in passing ERISA to look like the LMRA. Id. at 2066 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
237. See Beneficial, 123 S. Ct. at 2064 n.5.
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its face, that the standard was lowered and that the key inquiry is
shifted away from the importance of the particular language of the
statute. Indeed some courts have already found that to be the case.
For example, the Fifth Circuit recently reconsidered its precedent in
light of the new standard.238 Prior to Beneficial, the court had
examined the Carmack Amendment for any evidence of an intent
that the claims be removable.239 Because it found none, the court
held that the Carmack Amendment did not completely preempt state
240law claims in that area. However, the court recently stated that
after Beneficial, it was forced to reexamine its prior holding to see if
the Carmack Amendment was designed to be the exclusive remedy
for interstate shipping of goods by a common carrier.241 The court
held that under the new test, the Carmack Amendment did
completely preempt.242 This was not because of any language in the
statute, but rather because courts had consistently interpreted the
Carmack Amendment to supersede state remedies for breaches of
contract by interstate carriers.
243
A survey of claims brought under the Federal Communications
Act (FCA) provides another example of how federal courts have had
to adjust their analysis post-Beneficial. All of the circuits, save one,
have come down on the side of finding that the FCA does not
completely preempt state law regulating the communications
238. Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2003).
239. Id. at 775 (citing Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.
2000) as requiring that a statute evidence a clear congressional intent that
claims brought under the federal law be removable).
240. Id. (citing Beers v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir.
1988)).
241. Id. at 775-76.
242. Id. at 778.
243. Id. at 776-78. It is interesting to note that the cases cited in this section
appear to be discussing only conflict preemption. This is only one example of
where the Beneficial rule may serve to blur the line between the two types of
preemption.
Some circuits had already decided that the Carmack Amendment did
completely preempt; the shift is less dramatic in the various circuits that were
already using the essence of the Beneficial test for the Carmack Amendment.
See, e.g., Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d 1244, 1246-49 (11 th Cir.
2002) (finding that Congress's intent to eliminate state law claims related to
shipping and delivery of goods was sufficient for complete preemption).
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industry.244 The FCA contains several provisions forbidding the
states from regulating certain areas of communication law. For
example, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) prohibits the states from
regulating rates charged by commercial mobile phone services.
245
However, the courts have found that this is not clear enough intent to
find complete preemption.
Prior to Beneficial, a court could rest this holding on two
grounds. First, some courts found that there was nothing on the face
of the statute that evidenced a congressional intent to make FCA
cases removable.246 The second rationale is related to the first; the
FCA contained a savings clause stating that the state may continue to
regulate those areas not covered by the preemption provision.
247
Several post-Beneficial cases at the district level have made it clear
that this second rationale is sufficient to hold up the weight of the
248fimding of no complete preemption.
244. The one dissenting circuit is the Seventh Circuit, which has consistently
held to its decision in Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983 (7th
Cir. 2000), that the FCA completely preempts claims related to the regulation
of rates and market entry. See also Franczyk v. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., No.
03 C 6473, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 643, at *9 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2004).
245. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000).
246. See, e.g., Shaw v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. 3:00-CV-1614-L,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6,589, at *12 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2001).
247. See 47 U.S.C. § 414; Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2001). A similar rationale could be given for refusing to find complete
preemption under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 18, 26, 29, and 42), although the case law is
much more sparse on that issue. See O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183-84 (D. Wyo. 2001).
Of course, the existence of a savings clause alone is not sufficient to
disqualify a federal statute from complete preemption. ERISA has a savings
clause. See infra note 262 and accompanying text. However, one difference is
that, as blurry as the line may be, ERISA divides the area of health benefits
into two areas, with the state government and the federal government each
having control over one. On the other hand, FCA merely permits the states to
regulate as long as they are not in conflict with the federal law. One possible
explanation for the existence of a dissenting circuit on this issue is this elusive
distinction between separate sphere of control and the concurrent power to
regulate. See Bastien, 205 F.3d at 987-90 (finding complete preemption
despite the existence of a savings clause, in that the federal law creates an area
of exclusive federal control in which only the federal courts have jurisdiction).
248. See, e.g., Moriconi v. AT&T Wireless PCS, L.L.C., 280 F. Supp. 2d
867, 872-74 (E.D. Ark. 2003) (stating that although Beneficial changed the
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All of this leads to the conclusion that while the language
Congress uses is still important, it is certainly not determinative.
Other factors are considered in the purview of "congressional intent."
One such factor that will surely continue to be integral is the
similarity to already accepted preemptive law. For example, in
Taylor, the Court stated that it would hesitate to find that ERISA had
the force of complete preemption had it not been for the fact that
those who wrote ERISA modeled it after the language in LMRA, and
that the bill's sponsor had stated that the goal was to enact
preemption similar to that in LMRA.249 Similarly, in analyzing
whether the Railway Labor Act (RLA) completely preempted state
laws regulating collective bargaining agreements for railway and
airline employees, several courts have noted that the RLA has the
same function as the LMRA, and as such, is deserving of preemptive
force.25 °
semantics of the rule, preemption would still be an exceptional circumstance
and that the savings clause still is convincing evidence that Congress intended
the states to maintain some authority to regulate in this area); Gregory v. Sprint
Spectrum L.P., No. 03-CV-0676 W (POR), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10,943, at
*6-*8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2003) (stating that FCA's savings clause was
evidence that the FCA does not have an "extraordinary" preemptive force that
would transform a state claim into a federal one); see also Lewis v. Nextel
Communications, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (noting
that Beneficial makes the Seventh Circuit's dissenting position on the FCA
much shakier). However, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected the opportunity
to conform to the rest of the circuits, even though it cited to Beneficial in other
portions of the decision. See Fedor v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 355 F.3d 1069
(7th Cir. 2004).
249. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987).
250. See, e.g., Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir.
2000). As with many of these statutes, there are dissenters. The Eleventh
Circuit recently held that the RLA did not have the preemptive force necessary
for complete preemption. Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1357
(11th Cir. 2003). The court did a good job knocking out some of the
foundational bases that the other circuits had relied on, as well as focusing on
the differences in language between the LMRA and the RLA. Id. at 1354-56.
The RLA requires mandatory arbitration, while the LMRA does not, and as
such, the court said that the two are fundamentally different. Id. at 1356. The
court asserted that, under the RLA, the goals of preemption could be protected
just as well under conflict preemption because the mandatory arbitration
compels a certain amount of uniformity. Id. However, the truth is that part of
the reason for denying complete preemption was the fact that the RLA evinced
no congressional intent for removal. Id. Because Beneficial changed the
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Also important is the way in which the statute has been
interpreted in non-jurisdiction contexts. In Beneficial, the Supreme
Court found that the National Bank Act contained the exclusive
remedy for usury because, under the "longstanding and consistent
construction" of the Act, the federal remedies for using substantive
law were to be exclusive.25' Similarly in Hoskins v. Bekins Van
Lines, the court found it crucial that several courts had found state
substantive laws to be superseded in favor of federal law.2 52 In light
of Beneficial, the key evidence of congressional intent may be
whether the federal courts have treated the remedy as exclusive in
the past in substantive questions.
253
b. determining what Congress intended to preempt under
certain statutes
Once the federal courts have decided that certain jurisdictional
or preemptive language in a statute does confer this super-
preemptive power, the only remaining question is whether the
plaintiffs claim falls under the breadth of the preemptive power.
This again can be tricky. Does the extent of the complete
preemption match the breadth of the conflict preemption, or is it
much narrower than that?
The courts take a number of things into account when
interpreting the breadth of the preemption. The overarching theme is
that where complete preemption is found, it must be read narrowly
because of the questions of federalism that finding complete
preemption raises. The courts have taken their cue from the Supreme
Court's statement in Taylor that it would extend the reach of
complete preemption very reluctantly.
254
standard on that question, it is possible that the Eleventh Circuit would not
hold to its dissenting position in the future.
251. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2003).
252. Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 777-78 (5th Cir. 2003).
253. Again, this shifts the inquiry away from interpreting the language
Congress used and towards whether Congress meant to make something
exclusive. Both tests attempt to divine Congress's intent, but the second test
leaves much more room for the federal courts to find the intent necessary to
preempt.
254. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65.
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i. interpreting the breadth of preemption using the
statute's language
In most cases, the courts are doing little more than interpreting
the jurisdictional provision. For example, with preemption under the
LMRA, litigants are no longer arguing about whether the provisions
of the LMRA are completely preempted, but rather, what falls within
the preemptive power of § 301. The Supreme Court has said that
§ 301 preemption applies when a case "is substantially dependent
upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining agreement]."255
Such a flexible test leaves much room for litigation on the scope of
this clause.
Similarly, SLUSA preemption litigation today revolves around
several questions derived from the jurisdictional provision itself-for
example, what are "covered class actions, '25 6 what transactions are
considered "in connection" with the sale of those securities, 257 and
what "misrepresentations" are covered. 8
One incredibly complex question of statutory interpretation is
the area of ERISA preemption. As Justice Scalia noted in 1997, the
fact that ERISA cases were still coming to the Supreme Court meant
that the prior fourteen Supreme Court decisions related to ERISA
preemption had far from succeeded in defining the scope of the
subject.
259
Part of the confusion is that ERISA has a conflict preemption
clause, § 514(a), and a complete preemption clause, § 502(a).26 0 The
conflict preemption clause states that all state law claims "relate[d] to
255. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
256. Patenaude v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 290
F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2002).
257. Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting
the phrase "in connection with"); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th
Cir. 2002) (holding that receiving the information necessary to make a sale did
not fall within the scope of"in connection with" a sale).
258. Bums v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(interpreting the scope of misrepresentations covered under the SLUSA
preemption).
259. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). Since 1997, the Supreme
Court has heard several more cases dealing with ERISA preemption. See, e.g.,
Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Pegram v. Herdrich,
530 U.S. 211 (2000).
260. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1144 (2000).
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any employee benefit plan" are superseded, but saves certain suits
related to insurance from preemption. 26 1 However, the complete
preemption clause is narrower. The federal courts have interpreted
the scope of complete preemption to be coextensive with the
§ 502(a) civil enforcement provision, which states that "[a]
civil action may be brought... by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary... to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan., 262 The two questions are distinct and must be handled
separately, and neither one is particularly clear.
The general rule, then, is that if the claim meets the
requirements of § 514 but not the requirements of § 502(a), there is
only conflict preemption, which is not sufficient for removal.263
However, there appears to be a split in circuits as to whether or not
conflict preemption is a prerequisite to complete preemption.264 In
some circuits, complete preemption under ERISA is a two-step
process; a claim may be removed only if it meets the requirements of
§ 514 and § 502(a). However, several circuits, including the Fifth
265
and the Eleventh266 Circuits abandoned that position in 2003, leaving
only the Ninth267 and the Second 268 circuits still clinging to that
position.
The questions related to interpretation of § 502(a) are far too
numerous and complicated to lay out here, but provide one of the
hottest sources of jurisdictional litigation in the federal courts right
now.269 It is also interesting to note, in this discussion of forum
261. Id. § 1144(a)-(b).
262. Id. § 1132(a)(3)(ii).
263. See Marks v. Watters, 322 F.3d 316, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2003).
264. Ervast v. Flexible Prods. Co., 346 F.3d 1007, 1013 n.7 (11 th Cir. 2003).
265. Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2003).
266. Ervast, 346 F.3d at 1012-14.
267. See, e.g., Funkhouser v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 289 F.3d 1137, 1141-
42 (9th Cir. 2002).
268. Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144 (2d
Cir. 1995).
269. There are many excellent sources to help litigants untangle the maze of
ERISA questions that are beyond the scope of this Section. A good general
source is Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied
Preemption, Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 105 (2001). One dealing specifically with the HMO
preemption cases is PHYLLIS C. BORZI & MARC I. MACHIZ, ERISA and
Managed Care Plans: Key Preemption and Fiduciary Issues, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND LITIGATION; ACCESS
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selection, that while Congress designed ERISA to protect employees
and their benefits,270 ERISA has evolved into a shield against
generous state laws protecting employees and has moved a
significant number of cases into federal court.
ii. interpreting the breadth of preemption using
the statute's purpose
In determining the breadth of complete preemption, the federal
courts have also examined Congress's purpose for passing the
statute, a factor that will certainly become more important as the
inquiry under Beneficial shifts away from the explicit jurisdictional
language previously required. A common theme where the federal
courts have found complete preemption is that the statute was
passed, at least in part, to close off state remedies that undermined
federal policy. This not only counsels towards complete preemption;
it also provides guidance to the court as to how it should read the
preemption provision. For example, SLUSA was enacted in part to
close a federal flight loophole that existed in its predecessor, the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).271 Essentially,
because of heightened requirements for plaintiffs under PSLRA,
many plaintiffs were finding it much more advantageous to go
around the federal law and file claims in state court.272 Because this
undermined the broader goal of the statute, the courts have held that
SLUSA preemption must be construed so as to prevent this federal
flight problem.273 Therefore, any case that follows this rationale or
where it looks like the plaintiff is trying to get around the core of the
statute to take advantage of greener pastures is more likely to be
found to fall under the preemption provisions of SLUSA.
TO CARE AND TECHNOLOGY 71 (2002), WL SH027 ALI-ABA 71. One
caution is that almost every secondary source on ERISA is out of date by the
time it comes out because of the vast number of cases being decided on a
constant basis.
270. See Bogan, supra note 269, at 105-06.
271. Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 595-96 (8th Cir. 2002).
272. Id.
273. Id.; see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142
(1990); Bogan, supra note 269, at 117-18 (asserting that the goal of ERISA
was to provide employers with a uniform set of regulations and liabilities, and
that state remedies that fall outside those particular remedies thwart the goal of
the federal statute).
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In its most recent decision, Beneficial, the Supreme Court
explicitly mentioned this fact. The Court stated that the National
Bank Act was passed in part to enact "[u]niform rules limiting the
liability of national banks and prescribing exclusive remedies for
their overcharges [as] an integral part of a banking system that
needed protection from 'possible unfriendly [s]tate legislation.'
2 74
Because the plaintiffs pleaded so as to get around the effect of
federal law, their claim obviously fit within the scope of claims that
Congress would want governed by federal law. Similarly, plaintiffs
have a much easier case when they can show that their cause of
action does not fit the rationale for which Congress passed the law.
In the same way, courts will examine the issue of standing, i.e.,
what type of plaintiffs the complete preemption should cover. There
is general consensus that the mere fact that preemption will leave the
plaintiff before the court without a remedy is not sufficient to stop a
finding of complete preemption. 275  One court put it this way:
"[D]efendant[s] tow[] the case into the federal harbor only to try to
274. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2003)
(quoting Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 409, 412 (1873)).
All of these opinions stress that uniform rules are important, while none make
it clear exactly why a federal forum is necessary. Justice Scalia in Beneficial
makes this point by citing the amicus brief written by the United States. The
brief argued that removal was necessary because if the case were not removed,
the state might choose to ignore the federal law and allow the state claim to
proceed. Id. at 2069 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at,
17-18, Beneficial (No. 02-306)). However, this rationale is somewhat
dubious. Why should the danger be more prevalent here than anywhere else?
The answer comes from the basis of the artful pleading doctrine itself.
The artful pleading doctrine says that however the claim is pleaded, the court
can reshape it according to existing law. See infra Part III.C.2. If the plaintiff
pleads a state claim that is completely preempted, the court must re-
characterize it as a purely federal law claim because there is no state law left.
See infra Part III.C.2. Obviously, if the plaintiff had pleaded under federal
law, she would do so at the risk of being removed to federal court. Thus, the
plaintiffs choice to label her claims as state claims should not result in a state
forum when there really was no state law on the matter.
275. This is reflected in the number of times that defendants are filing a
motion to remove at the same time as a motion to dismiss. This is one of the
prime payouts of preemption for defendants; often the plaintiff's claim is one
that is not covered under the federal statute, meaning that complete preemption
will equal dismissal. This may also be why the complete preemption debate
centers around only a few limited statutes. ERISA and SLUSA preemption
provide broad incentives for corporate defendants in that they cut off state
statutes favorable to plaintiffs.
1494
Summer 2004] FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
sink it once it is in port.'276 The rationale for this goes back to
something said earlier-Congress may say as much when it
eliminates certain relief or certain causes of action for a particular
plaintiff as when it creates them. Congress's choice to create certain
causes of action for a particular group of plaintiffs makes the
omission of other causes of action for that plaintiff significant.
However, a plaintiff has a better argument that the claim should
not be preempted if it falls outside of the enforcement provisions of
the statute altogether, i.e., that the statute does not provide a remedy
for this class of plaintiff at all. The generally accepted complete
preemption statutes have been interpreted this way. One of the
first Supreme Court preemption cases, Franchise Tax Board,
demonstrated that the cases of persons who do not come within the
civil enforcement provision of ERISA are not preempted.277
The same is true of other federal statutes. The Copyright Act
only preempts those causes of action where the right protected under
the federal law is equivalent to the rights under state law.278 Where
the state law adds an "extra element" to the Copyright Act, a
plaintiffs case brought under that state law will no longer be
removable. 279 The case is even stronger under the new Beneficial
standard; as one court recently stated, "Congress cannot be said to
have provided an exclusive federal remedy where, as here, they have
provided no remedy whatsoever [for this plaintiff].,, 280 As such, one
of the best ways for plaintiffs to get around complete preemption is
276. La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 644 F. Supp. 942, 948 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
277. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1
(1983) (finding that the tax board's claim was not preempted under ERISA
because ERISA created no counterpart to appellant's state claim).
"Section 502(a) specifies which persons-participants, beneficiaries,
fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor-may bring actions for
particular kinds of relief. It neither creates nor expressly denies any
cause of action in favor of state governments, to enforce tax levies
.... [This] makes [it] clear that Congress did not intend to pre-empt
entirely every state cause of action relating to such plans."
Id. at 25.
278. See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir.
1993).
279. See id. at 229-30.
280. JK&E P'ship v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 03-CV-2543 (DGT), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 587, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2004).
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to show that Congress's regulation targeted a narrower group that did
not include them.
In summary, the general rule under Beneficial is that complete
preemption only applies in certain areas of the law where Congress
intended federal law to be the exclusive remedy for certain claims.28'
This means that only some statutes have the preemptive effect
necessary to preempt not only state substantive law, but also to
remove jurisdiction from state forums. It also means that even
claims brought under those statutes may not be preempted if they are
not the kind of claim that Congress intended to preempt.
The most obvious effect of the change from looking at "intent to
remove" to "intent to be an exclusive remedy" is that many more
cases can be removed to federal court. Justice Scalia said that the
Court's Beneficial decision "effectuate[d] a significant shift in
decisional authority from state to federal courts. 282  The test is
significantly broader than the prior test; while the prior test
emphasized Congress's selective intent to shift the venue from state
to federal court, the current test emphasizes Congress's intent to shift
from state to federal law, something that Congress presumably does
more routinely.
One final thing to remember is that orders remanding a case to
state court are not reviewable by a federal appellate court.283 The
rule is not absolute; there are several judge made exceptions.
284
However, the general rule is that the appellate court will not be able
285to review, even where the decision is wrong. The practical effect
of this is that the plaintiff only has to win once, while the defendant
has to continue winning up the appellate ladder.
281. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2003).
282. Id. at 2068 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. See infra Part V.G.5 for a more in-depth discussion of the appealability
of remand orders.
284. See Dorothy F. Easley, Remand Orders in ERISA Cases: When Are
They Reviewable in the 11th Circuit?, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2003, at 88 (describing
the various exceptions to the § 1447(c) prohibition of appellate review on
ERISA remand orders).
285. See Dahl v. Rosenfeld, 316 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that there was no avenue to overturn the district court's remand order, even
though it was wrongly decided in light of Ninth Circuit precedent).
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3 Impact on litigants
As stated above, the plaintiff has several modes of attacking a
claim that potentially falls within the realm of a completely
peremptory statute. The first is to try to bring a successful claim
under the federal statute. There may be times when it is not worth
challenging removal because the federal law is clearly peremptory or
because the federal law is not that harmful to the plaintiff's case.
The second is to argue that the statute does not have the
preemptive force necessary for complete preemption. Again, under
Beneficial, this means arguing that Congress did not intend the
federal law to be the exclusive remedy for this type of claim. To
show this, the plaintiff will need to show that allowing the state
remedy to exist alongside of the federal remedy will not thwart
Congress's intention in passing the law, and that the federal courts
have not traditionally interpreted the federal law to be exclusive.
With Beneficial, no statute is "safe" from reconsideration, and
plaintiffs may find, as in Hoskins, that certain enclaves of state law
are no longer protected from jurisdictional preemption.
The third is to argue that the preemptive force of the statute does
not cover the plaintiffs claim. As laid out above, the preemptive
scope of a statute is interpreted narrowly, and so the plaintiff may be
able to argue that the purpose of the exclusive remedy does not
include her particular claim at all.
The final strategy is to forego the strongest state claim and adapt
other state law claims that are outside preemptive reach. As with
substantial federal questions, the plaintiff is the master of the
complaint; the plaintiff can forego certain claims altogether if she
determines that there is a better chance of recovery without the claim
in state court than there is with the claim in federal court. The
broader reach of the Beneficial test means that the calculus is shifted
somewhat: if Congress intended a federal statute to be the exclusive
remedy for a certain wrong, then no matter which state claim is
brought, it is likely to be preempted.
Of course, the defendant may have little to lose by removing
under preemption in close cases, especially where the payoff is an
automatic dismissal. Especially given the broad test that the
Supreme Court used in Beneficial, defendants have a strong incentive
to argue for complete preemption in many cases. Furthermore, as
above, the wealthy defendant can win not only by getting the case
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removed to federal court, but also by extending the time and cost of
litigation to the point where it is not worth the plaintiffs effort to
fight the forum selection battle.
4 Relationship between preemption and substantial
federal question
There is one circuit that has said that the complete preemption
exception entirely swallows up the artful pleading doctrine.286 The
Fifth Circuit has said that there should be no substantial federal
interest unless Congress has gone so far as to preempt state law in an
area.28 7 Its basis for holding so lies with a strict reading of the
Supreme Court's holding in Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana,
288
where the Court said that artful pleading "allows removal where
federal law completely preempts a plaintiffs state-law claim," but
says nothing about any other type of artful pleading.289 A few other
courts have expressed this assertion.290  The idea has a certain
appeal; the question is certainly not substantial enough that Congress
felt the need to have exclusive control over the area, so the state
court should not be shut out of interpreting the law. In some ways,
this comes closer to effectuating Congress's intent.
However, while most courts have indeed recognized that most
situations of artful pleading will be complete preemption cases,291
the Fifth Circuit stands alone in saying that complete preemption
swallows up the doctrine of artful pleading. Furthermore, because it
seems like the scope of federal question jurisdiction is generally
broadening, rather than constricting, it seems unlikely that the
majority of courts will move in this direction.
286. See Terrebonne Homecare, Inc., v. SMA Health Plan, Inc., 271 F.3d
186, 188-89 (5th Cir. 2001); Waste Control Specialists v. Envirocare of Tex.,
Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 783-84 (5th Cir. 2000).
287. Terrebonne Homecare, 271 F.3d at 188-89; Waste Control Specialists,
199 F. 3d at 783-84.
288. 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
289. Id. at 475.
290. See State ex rel. Nixon v. Nextel W. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889
(E.D. Mo. 2003).
291. See New York v. Justin, 237 F. Supp. 2d 368,372 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(stating that the "'classic application of the artful pleading doctrine occurs in
the context of federal preemption of state law"' (quoting Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1986))).
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E. Conclusion
In conclusion, there are three points that should be emphasized.
First, plaintiffs and defendants both have a vested interest in
influencing the forum decision for their benefit. Whether the
advantage is favorable federal law or more advantageous procedure,
parties will often try to push a suit towards either federal or state
court. The concept of parity between federal and state courts is
dead.292
Second, two broad trends describe the shift that federal courts
have effected in the federal question debate, and affect the shape of
that debate. The first is a general shifting of cases from state courts
to federal courts. This can be seen in Congress's decision to
federalize certain statutes that typically would have been heard in
state court, and also in the liberalization of "substantiality." This
trend is also apparent from the Beneficial decision, under which a
larger class of cases is preempted and therefore heard in federal
court. The effect of this "federalization" is that plaintiffs will have to
work harder to keep their cases out of federal court. The subtler
trend is from congressional control over jurisdiction to the courts
taking a more active role. Changes in complete preemption shift the
courts' role away from interpreting the language of the statutes to
devising what Congress "meant." This also means that litigants will
play a more active role in arguing that certain claims should be heard
in federal court.
The final point to emphasize here is that plaintiffs can and are
using their initial control over pleading to affect the choice of forum.
Federal question jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to quantify the
advantages and disadvantages of a federal forum, as well as the
chances of success with and without federal law. This means
appealing to the federal and state interests in the suit, the concerns
regarding federalism, and the purposes of federal question
jurisdiction. It also means choosing what claims to bring and how to
phrase them. By understanding the rules and trends in federal
292. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U.
L. REv. 593 (1991) (discussing the emergence and assumptions behind the
parity debate and offering an alternative approach for defining federal court
jurisdiction).
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question jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the best opportunity to design
and phrase its claim to obtain the chosen forum.
